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ABSTRACT
This Article describes the rift between a due-process-focused
jurisprudence on legal–financial obligations—the centerpiece of the
current fight against criminalization of poverty—and the substantive
and structural problems of poverty criminalization. It argues that
judges can help address this disconnect while still operating within the
scope of their authority by engaging in a demosprudence of poverty—
“a democracy-enhancing jurisprudence” that actively seeks to learn
from poor people themselves and movements for economic justice.
This Article builds from demosprudential theory to offer guidance for
judges in their reason-giving, rulemaking, and courtroom management
practices.
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INTRODUCTION
In the waning days of his administration, President Barack Obama
published a commentary in the Harvard Law Review outlining his
vision of the president’s role in criminal legal reform.1 In this essay,
President Obama discussed a “sustained focus” of his administration:
“Eliminating the Criminalization of Poverty” by “addressing excessive
fines and fees, inadequate legal representation, the imposition of
excessive bail, and other egregious abuses in too many state and local
justice systems.”2
President Obama was not the only one to link the “criminalization
of poverty” with issues of fines, fees, bail, and other “legal financial
obligations.”3 For many, this conversation was spurred by the 2014
police shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.4 Subsequent
1. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 843 (2017).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Monica Llorente, Criminalizing Poverty Through Fines, Fees, and Costs, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2016/criminalizing-poverty-fines-fees-costs [https://perma.cc/25BE-2PR8]
(describing a continuing legal education program linking the criminalization of poverty to fines,
fees, and bail issues); Case Search, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/
search.php [https://perma.cc/JB3H-SQN4] (naming, in a database of civil rights litigation, a
“Special Collection” of cases “Fines/Fees/Bail Reform (Criminalization of poverty)”).
4. See Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, How the Justice System Criminalizes the Poor—And
Funds Itself in the Process, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2019, 6:01 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/29/how-justice-system-criminalizes-poor-
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investigations by journalists and a U.S. Department of Justice report
revealed the extortionary dynamics of criminal legal debt in Ferguson
and other localities across the country.5 Indeed, President Obama
himself tied the criminalization of poverty to Ferguson’s judicial
policies, noting that the city’s practice of “us[ing] its justice system as a
cash register” was “[t]he most glaring example, but by no means an
outlier” among American localities.6
But the criminal legal system’s7 entanglements with the lives of
those living in poverty begin long before a defendant is first booked

funds-itself-process [https://perma.cc/YED7-BK6U] (referencing how “the nation was shocked to
learn” about Ferguson’s criminalization of poverty).
5. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT]; Matthew
Shaer, How Cities Make Money by Fining the Poor, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/magazine/cities-fine-poor-jail.html [https://perma.cc/FJD5F4D8] (outlining how the imposition of criminal fines has affected poor individuals).
6. Obama, supra note 1, at 844.
7. This Article tends to use “criminal legal system” instead of the current standard term of
art, “criminal justice system.” We view “criminal legal system” as a more objective way of
describing the legal components of current American institutions of control and punishment.
These institutions—criminal lawmaking, policing, courts, prison, probation, and more—do not
come together to constitute a system of “justice”; they collectively function primarily as a means
of control and often perpetuate profoundly unjust management of populations. See, e.g., Sharon
Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW
CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 1, 2–4 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017)
(describing essential elements of “the criminal system”); see also Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the
Boundaries of “Criminal Justice,” 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 620 (2018) (“Given the widely
articulated concerns about structural inequality and the massive U.S. prison population, is
‘criminal justice’ an accurate or appropriate description of the nation’s model of criminalization,
policing, prosecution, and punishment?”). At their best, these institutions constitute a system of
law. Even as we retain the word “system,” we also recognize that the criminal legal system is not
a single system. We share other scholars’ concern that the language of “system,” a relic of late
1960s functionalist theories, may obscure context, complexity, and irrationality within and
between particular criminalizing institutions and limit imaginings about new frameworks for
justice. See Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “the Criminal Justice System,” 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 66–76,
86–88 (2018); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 461 (1993) (“[T]he criminal justice ‘system’ is not a system at all. This particular mirror
of society is a jigsaw puzzle with a thousand tiny pieces. No one is really in charge.”); Bernard E.
Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL STUDS. 419, 421 (2018) (“The decision to conceptualize and then analyze a
criminal justice system, for instance, rather than another metaphorical system such as the racial
equality system, will necessarily assign certain political values . . . and relegate other political
values to the margins.”); cf. Ashley Rubin & Michelle S. Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State
Actors and the Role of Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422, 423–26
(2017) (identifying similar problems with more recently popularized terms—“the penal state” and
“the carceral state”). Nonetheless, we find some value in system language because it allows us to
speak comprehensively about the cumulative effects of particular multiple interlocking
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into jail or appears in court—when questions of bail, fines, and fees
first arise. Rather, understanding the criminalization of poverty
requires examining why someone is labeled a “criminal” in the first
place. This requires scrutinizing what society chooses to criminalize
and what structures are put in place to enforce those norms. American
states and localities criminalize poverty by, among other things,
prohibiting conduct engaged in largely by poor individuals, such as
selling loose cigarettes;8 selectively enforcing vague quality-of-life
laws—like anti-loitering ordinances—against poor individuals;9 and
imposing additional obligations on and surveilling those who apply for
or receive public benefits.10 In this way, the criminal legal system
punishes and exerts control over poor individuals and communities,
resulting in the reinforcement of multiple, interlocking social
hierarchies.
Contemporary scholarship about and litigation over the
constitutionality of the most abusive practices associated with legal–
financial obligations (“LFOs”)—the fines, fees, and other costs
imposed by courts—has been written against the backdrop of these
social realities. But what we refer to as the “substantive” and
“structural” elements of the criminalization of poverty have generally
not been central to litigants’ claims against fines, fees, or bail systems,
nor have courts extensively grappled with these issues in their
discussions of the status quo.
Doctrinal path dependency is at least partially responsible for this
focus. Much of the litigation around the criminalization of poverty
focuses on LFOs; much of this in turn builds off of the Supreme Court’s
central holding in Bearden v. Georgia11 that states may not “imprison a
person solely because he lacked the resources to pay” a fine, fee,
restitution, or bail.12 Though Bearden would appear to provide a broad
institutions, even though the sum of those institutions does not meet the formal definition of a
system.
8. See Emily Badger, Alton Sterling, Eric Garner and the Double Standard of the Side
Hustle, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016, 10:19 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/07/07/alton-sterling-eric-garner-and-the-double-standard-of-the-side-hustle [https://perma.cc/4A2RWVZ7] (noting that Eric Garner was selling loose cigarettes when he was detained by the police).
9. Chris Herring, Dilara Yarbrough & Lisa Marie Alatorre, Pervasive Penalty: How the
Criminalization of Poverty Perpetuates Homelessness, 2019 SOC. PROBS. 1, 2–3.
10. See infra Parts I.A.1.b and I.A.2.b (describing legal systems that both penalize and
scrutinize public-benefits recipients).
11. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
12. Id. at 667–68. For analogous analysis in the civil context, compare Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevents a state from denying
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substantive defense against the criminalization of the impoverished, in
the realm of LFOs, the Court has instead adopted a process-oriented
framing that places the problem of the criminalization of poverty
within the court system at the level of an individual criminal or civil
case. In essence, the Court demands that “in revocation proceedings
for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire
into the reasons for the failure to pay” to ensure that an individual’s
financial circumstances are not overlooked and thus lead to
indiscriminate incarceration.13 It is within this context that discussions
about access to legal counsel, court fines and fees, pretrial detention,
and bail are paramount. But these discussions only begin when the
defendant passes through the courthouse doors.
However, there is a way for courts to recognize substantive and
structural matters of poverty while staying within the ostensible
confines of current doctrine. The concept of demosprudence, originally
developed by Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, is a way to
understand the interaction of law and social movements in ways
beyond traditional rights claims-making in courts, in which
marginalized people seek recognition of legal rights from judges, and
judges either bless their legal claims or not.14 In a traditional civil rights
framework, the audience for rights claims is ultimately the courts, and
the propriety of a conversation about the existence or scope of a right
is determined by how a court may rule or has ruled on it.
Demosprudence, in contrast, sees rights as a marker for an iterative
process that may include courts and legal elites but is not primarily
defined by them. Demosprudence sees regular people as agentic colaborers in a collective project of rights recognition and problemsolving. As Professors Guinier and Torres explain:
Whereas jurisprudence examines the extent to which the rights of
discrete and insular minorities are protected by judges interpreting
ordinary legal and constitutional doctrine, demosprudence explores
the ways that political, economic, or social minorities cannot simply
rely on judicial decisions as the solution to their problems. Rather

access to the only adjudicative forum in which an indigent person’s dispute can be resolved), with
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449–50 (1973) (holding that it does not violate the Due Process
Clause for a state to require indigent litigants to pay bankruptcy court fees because bankruptcy
court is not the only forum available).
13. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
14. See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014) (introducing and
articulating the demosprudence paradigm).
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than turning over their agency to lawyers, they must find a way to
integrate lawyers not as leaders but as fellow advocates.15

Although the earliest version of the concept focused on the
capacity of judges to behave demosprudentially,16 the degree to which
judges can engage in demosprudence is currently unsettled.17 This
Article reaffirms the capacity of judges to engage in “democracyenhancing jurisprudence,” shoring up the idea that demosprudence is
in part a conversation between the public and the courts.18 Judges are
not the central actors or audience within a demosprudential
framework—the people are. Yet, judges can play multiple roles in a
demosprudential framework.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the rift
between due-process-focused jurisprudence on LFOs—the
centerpiece of the current fight against the criminalization of poverty—
and the substantive problem of poverty criminalization. Part II argues
that judges can help address this disconnect while still operating within
the scope of their authority by engaging in a demosprudence of
poverty—“a democracy-enhancing jurisprudence” that includes “legal
practices that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the people.”19
Part III identifies two possible critiques to a demosprudential approach
to judging and responds to each.
I. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
AND THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
This Part seeks to reintegrate an understanding of what, whom,
and how we punish into current discussions of criminal legal debt and
to illuminate the ways in which a process-based approach to these
issues has largely failed. Section A outlines three ways that substantive
laws and enforcement patterns have criminalized and reproduced
poverty in the United States. First, criminalization punishes the poor
for their poverty. For example, the system sanctions those who either
fail to meet prevailing middle-class notions about work and family or

15. Id. at 2479 (internal quotation omitted).
16. See Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16
(2008) [hereinafter Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent] (exploring “the democratic
potential of dissenting opinions”).
17. See infra note 194 (noting sources that explore demosprudence by nonjudicial actors).
18. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 16, at 50 (identifying one
element of demosprudential dissent as “facilitat[ing] an ongoing public conversation”).
19. Id. at 15–16.



2020]

   

  

TOWARD A DEMOSPRUDENCE OF POVERTY





1479

require government aid to support their families. Second,
criminalization creates a means of control over these individuals and
communities. For instance, criminal legal institutions both surveil
recipients of social benefits and condition aid on the acceptance of a
“criminal” status. Finally, criminalization enforces and entrenches
hierarchies—of race, class, gender, and more. By doing so,
criminalization stigmatizes those without privilege and ensures that
they can never gain the means to overcome that status. Together, these
“web[s] of state policies”20 violate ostensible norms of equal treatment
before the law, well before any litigant steps inside a police station or
courtroom.
Section B discusses the origins and development of a separate,
process-based framing of the criminalization of poverty. It explores
how the Supreme Court’s foundational decisions addressing LFOs
have emphasized procedural due process as the appropriate
framework with which to approach the criminal legal system’s potential
to disparately impact poor defendants. It then surveys the scholarship
and advocacy reinforcing this procedural approach in the wake of
Ferguson.
A. Substance and Structure in the Criminalization of Poverty
Questions concerning what and whom we punish have not gone
entirely unacknowledged, especially post-Ferguson. In its report on
policing and criminal legal practices in Ferguson, for instance, the U.S.
Department of Justice observed that disparate policing and onerous
court costs “impose[d] a particular hardship upon Ferguson’s most
vulnerable residents, especially upon those living in or near poverty.”21
Courts grappling with legal challenges to policies burdening
impoverished individuals have similarly recognized these policies’
disparate impact. For example, when the Southern District of Texas
found Houston’s bail practices unconstitutional in ODonnell v. Harris
County,22 the court noted that bail was denied “in the vast majority of
cases” concerning “[t]hose arrested for crimes relating to poverty, such
as petty theft, trespassing, and begging, as well as those whose risk

20. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643,
646 (2009) [hereinafter Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty].
21. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4.
22. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
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scores are inflated by poverty indicators, such as the lack of a car.”23 In
other words, those living in poverty not only feel policies governing bail
more acutely but also are subject to these practices more often. These
practices and policies help trap people in poverty,24 which in turn
makes them more susceptible to the same or similar practices and
policies in the future.
But as the ODonnell decision demonstrates, courts and
policymakers grappling with the procedural rights afforded to those
lacking the ability to pay have not centered their work on the
underlying substantive patterns of criminalization. This emphasis has,
perhaps inadvertently, moved the discussion away from an existing
wealth of scholarship and case law explicitly exploring the impact of
disparate patterns of criminalization and policing on poor individuals
and communities. The next Subsection explores some of that research
and case law, which we believe is essential to understanding the context
in which LFOs operate.
1. Criminalization as Punishment. Choices of what to criminalize
and how to enforce criminal provisions often result in the punishment
of the poor because of their poverty. Two major aspects of the
punishment of poverty are worth noting. First, these laws stigmatize
people based on their status—sanctioning those who engage in
otherwise ordinary acts but do so while poor. Second, these laws
penalize those who rely on public benefits to gain the resources needed
to obtain middle-class status. In both cases, it is an individual’s
economic means—not their conduct—that entangles them and their
community with the criminal legal system.
a. Punishing Poverty. Criminal codes throughout the United
States have long punished those who fail to adhere to social norms
because of their poverty. For much of American history, vagrancy laws
were the prototypical example. As legal historian Dean Risa Goluboff
explains, “vagrancy laws made it a crime to be a certain type of
person.”25 These laws “subject persons, whose habits of life are such as

23. Id. at 1130.
24. See Sara S. Greene, A Theory of Poverty: Legal Immobility, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 753,
756 (2019) [hereinafter Greene, A Theory of Poverty] (calling for a broader poverty law “that
considers how the cumulative effect of laws—particularly state and local laws—may be a
mechanism through which poverty is created, perpetuated, and exacerbated”).
25. RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE,
AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 2 (2016).
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to make them objectionable members of society, to police regulations
promotive of the safety or good order of the community in which they
are found.”26 For instance, one such ordinance in Jacksonville, Florida,
criminalized those who fit one of twenty different descriptors,
including “[r]ogues and vagabonds,” “common drunkards,”
“disorderly persons,” and even those who just “wander[ed] or
stroll[ed] around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object.”27 The effect of such laws, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,28 was to place “unfettered
discretion . . . in the hands of the . . . police,”29 who could criminalize
the acts of “poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, [and] idlers”30
merely for engaging in “activities [that] are historically part of the
amenities of life as we have known them.”31 The Court objected to the
“presumption” that those who transgress these middle-class standards
“are to become future criminals”—which it found “too precarious for
a rule of law.”32 Therefore, the Court found the Jacksonville ordinance
unconstitutionally vague.33
Since Papachristou, the U.S. legal system has moved away from
laws that explicitly criminalize low status using vague vagrancy
standards. However, the criminalization of low status has reemerged in
new forms in the intervening decades.34 For example, one increasingly
common tactic effectively targets homelessness through local
ordinances by outlawing the performance of otherwise uncontroversial
activities in public. These include bans on sleeping, sitting, and lying
down in public; prohibitions forbidding camping or living in vehicles;
and limits on “loitering” or “loafing.”35 These laws effectively punish
26. 91 C.J.S. Vagrancy and Related Offenses § 4 (2012); see also GOLUBOFF, supra note 25,
at 2 (citing the 1955 edition of Corpus Juris Secundum).
27. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972).
28. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
29. Id. at 168.
30. Id. at 170.
31. Id. at 164.
32. Id. at 171.
33. Id. at 162.
34. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 25, at 338–39 (noting the evolution and persistence of
vagrancy laws since Papachristou); see also Risa L. Goluboff, Starbucks, LA Fitness and the Long,
Racist History of America’s Loitering Laws, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/20/starbucks-la-fitness-and-theracist-history-of-trespassing-laws [https://perma.cc/J3EX-QHZ2] (explaining how law
enforcement found new outlets for discrimination in the absence of vagrancy laws).
35. TRISTIA BAUMAN ET AL., NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING
NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 10 (2018),
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some of the most vulnerable individuals—those who are homeless—
for having nowhere else to go. When asked to directly address the
validity of these ordinances, courts have occasionally found the
enforcement of such laws unconstitutional, at least when they “harass[]
and otherwise interfer[e] with homeless people for engaging in basic
activities of daily life—including sleeping and eating—in the public
places where they are forced to live.”36 For example, in 2019 the Ninth
Circuit held that the enforcement of such ordinances in Boise, Idaho—
a city with a shortage of shelter beds—violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because
they “criminalize conduct that is an unavoidable consequence of being
homeless.”37
Despite these potential constitutional limits, laws criminalizing
being poor in public are common. A recent survey of 187 cities from
the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty found that,
between 2006 and 2016, the number of city-wide anticamping
ordinances increased by 69 percent, while the number of laws
prohibiting sleeping in public city-wide increased by 31 percent.38
Other new and increasingly common criminal prohibitions include
“crime-free housing ordinances” and housing-code enforcement
regimes, both of which label many ordinary acts of life in poorer
communities as “nuisance.”39 These laws can lead to a vicious cycle of
criminalization. For example, 9-1-1-abuse ordinances—which
criminalize the perceived “overuse” of emergency-response systems,
no matter the reason—effectively punish those seeking to impose order
in lower-income, high-crime neighborhoods.40
Legal structures criminalize the act of living in poverty more
explicitly as well. For instance, across the United States the childwelfare system “penalizes poverty conditions” by labeling lack of food,
shelter, or clothing as “environmental neglect.”41 Like vagrancy laws,
https://nlchp.org//wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Housing-Not-Handcuffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FR5G-WSNR].
36. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
37. Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 617 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006)), cert denied, No. 19-247, 2019 WL 6833408 (U.S.
Dec. 16, 2019).
38. BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 10.
39. See Greene, A Theory of Poverty, supra note 24, at 771 (“This can include things ranging
from bright lights, disturbing the peace, loitering, vagrancy, major health hazards, and a wide
range of other actions and situations.”).
40. Id. at 772–73.
41. Id. at 778–79.
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child-welfare statutes define neglect and abuse only in general terms,
giving social workers extraordinary discretion.42 Professor Sara Greene
notes that states can impose such broad standards without public
outcry because “they tend to be employed almost exclusively in poor
communities.”43 This lack of publicity also allows states to mete out
more extreme punishments for the same “offense” when crimes in
question are “committed by a poor parent in an area of high
concentrated poverty.”44
Punishment via the child-welfare system is often used as a threat
against poor families. For example, in July 2019 one Pennsylvania
school district sent letters threatening to institute child-welfare
proceedings to parents whose children had accumulated school-lunch
debt.45 The inability to pay for public-school lunch, the letter claimed,
constituted “a failure to provide [a] child with proper nutrition[,] . . .
neglecting [that] child’s right to food.”46 After local politicians faced an
onslaught of negative publicity, they quickly disavowed the letter and
acknowledged their missive “weaponize[d]” the county’s welfare
system and “terrorize[d]” families for the noncriminal act of failing to
pay a debt.47
Although appealing to law-and-order advocates, punishing people
for being poor does little more than impose new barriers to upward
mobility. In the homelessness context, for instance, studies have found
that public-space ordinances are counterproductive—at least if their
purpose is to deter the conduct deemed criminal. A study of
antihomeless enforcement in San Francisco found that “consistent
punitive interactions”—such as move-along orders, citations, property
confiscation, and threats of arrest—at best created only a “spatial
churn” in the city.48 Those told to move had only one option: finding a
new public place to stay. The study authors concluded that such
enforcement “systematically limit[s] homeless people’s access to
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 779 (quoting Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far?,
NATION (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-protective-services-gonetoo-far [https://perma.cc/LQ4W-TV4L] (statement of Martin Guggenheim, New York University
law professor and co-director of New York University Law School’s Family Defense Clinic)).
44. Id.
45. Derrick Bryson Taylor, Children Face Foster Care over School Meal Debt, District Warns,
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/us/school-lunch-bills-overduepayment.html [https://perma.cc/6UWG-CKPX].
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Luzerne County Manager C. David Pedri).
48. Herring et al., supra note 9, at 1.
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services, housing, and jobs, while damaging their health, safety, and
well-being.”49 In other contexts, too, researchers have long noted that
the collateral consequences of criminal convictions—including
ineligibility for government-funded housing and aid—merely
perpetuate the cycle of poverty for low-income offenders.50
b. Punishing Public Benefits. While some laws punish the poor
explicitly for their poverty, others penalize those who must rely on
government aid to survive. Programs to punish beneficiaries of
government aid most captured public attention in the 1980s with
President Ronald Reagan’s invocation of the “welfare queen”—a
narrative that stereotyped poor, typically Black, women on welfare as
both “uneducated, lazy, and irrational” and as “hyperrational” actors
gaming the system for profit.51 In the decades since, this pervasive myth
has helped spawn a number of mechanisms of control and reprimand,
including invasive inquiries into eligibility and extensive policing for
“fraud.”52 As Professor Kaaryn Gustafson contends in her studies of
public-benefits recipients, in the United States “[t]he public desire to
deter and punish welfare cheating has overwhelmed the will to provide
economic security to vulnerable members of society.”53
Scrutiny of welfare recipients and punishment of those perceived
as “cheating” serve as gatekeeping mechanisms: they set up barriers to
accessing benefits, label those who cannot overcome them as criminal,
and keep those who did qualify in constant fear of failing out of the
system. One of the primary barriers to entry is the byzantine set of
eligibility requirements for federal and state aid applicants, such as
work stipulations that require onerous levels of reporting.54 Such
49. Id.; see also BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 13–14 (criticizing the criminalization of
homelessness).
50. See KAREN DOLAN WITH JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., THE POOR GET
PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 6–8 (2015),
https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SDK9-5NQN].
51. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 36 (2011).
52. Id. at 56–57 (“The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation required states to institute
fraud prevention programs.”).
53. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 644.
54. A review of studies on TANF and SNAP work requirements from the Urban Institute
found that red tape—including requirements for beneficiaries to track and case workers to verify
working hours—often “cause people to lose access to vital supports, even when they are working
or should be exempt” from the requirements. HEATHER HAHN, URB. INST., WHAT RESEARCH
TELLS US ABOUT WORK REQUIREMENTS 2 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
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eligibility criteria not only make it more difficult to gain access to
benefits, but also make it harder to keep them. More than two million
individuals lost access to the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(“TANF”) program between 1997 and 2018 because they failed to
meet work requirements.55 In many cases, individuals lost coverage not
because they did not work, but rather because they worked irregular
hours or simply could not keep up with the record-keeping
requirements these programs impose.56 Even for those who clear the
hurdle of proving general eligibility, regular sanctions—usually in the
form of benefit reductions—are now an expectation for benefitsprogram participants. In the years following the implementation of
TANF, some researchers have estimated that between one-third and
one-half of all recipients were sanctioned.57
Beyond these reporting requirements, scholars have argued that
high levels of punishment result inevitably from the very structure of
safety-net systems—which severely limit benefit levels but also render
ineligible those with too much additional income. In effect, the system
itself makes it impossible to both comply with program requirements
and provide for a family.58 As of 2010, the maximum federal benefits
under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) and
TANF could not raise a family above the federal poverty line.59
Therefore, recipients must often engage in some level of cheating—
generally by misreporting income—to survive.60 In effect, the welfare
system both produces and punishes law breakers because, as Professor

files/publication/98425/what_research_tells_us_about_work_requirements_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4NL-ZMHJ]; see also HEATHER HAHN ET AL., URB. INST., WORK
REQUIREMENTS
IN
SOCIAL
SAFETY
NET
PROGRAMS
1,
10
(2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/95566/work-requirements-in-social-safetynet-programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LMJ-E6LS].
55. LADONNA PAVETTI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TANF STUDIES SHOW
WORK REQUIREMENT PROPOSALS FOR OTHER PROGRAMS WOULD HARM MILLIONS, DO
LITTLE TO INCREASE WORK 2 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-1318tanf.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8LD-33VR].
56. See HAHN ET AL., supra note 54, at 6.
57. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 663.
58. Id. at 681.
59. Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income
Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 305 (2013) [hereinafter Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies].
60. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 681–82. This welfare dynamic is
not new; the 1996 introduction of TANF intensified it. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN,
MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 43–
45 (1997).
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Gustafson explains, “everyday activities of making ends meet amount
to crime.”61
Punishments for such “cheating” go beyond mere reductions in
aid, largely due to the increasingly blurred boundaries between the
criminal and social-welfare systems. As of 2011, more than one-third
of California’s fifty-eight counties had moved welfare-fraud
investigations to District Attorney offices, while another nine housed
satellite D.A. offices within the welfare office.62 Although welfare
investigations still generally lead to noncriminal administrative
proceedings, recipients—with no right to counsel—can make
admissions with criminal consequences.63 Professors Spencer
Headworth and Shaun Ossei-Owusu have found that, in practice, the
legal environments poor people encounter in criminal adjudications
and welfare-fraud proceedings do not differ; in both, “adverse
consequences are largely a foregone conclusion for the accused
poor.”64
Again, as with laws that punish the very acts of living while poor,
systems that penalize benefits recipients do little to further stated goals
of reducing disorder. According to a 2002 federal oversight report of
those dropped from Social Security, SNAP, and TANF rolls after the
state identified them as “fugitive felons,” a full quarter of the
beneficiaries kicked out of these programs had been cited for parole or
probation violations alone.65 Likewise, these benefits systems do not
appear to meet any stated good-governance goals. For instance, a 2011
Florida law requiring mandatory drug testing for TANF applicants cost
the state more in testing fees than it saved by cutting benefits to
ineligible applicants.66 Notwithstanding their irrationality, these laws
continue to punish the poor.
2. Criminalization as Control. Laws and enforcement patterns
further criminalize poverty to control low-income individuals and

61. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 682.
62. Id. at 686.
63. Id. at 709–10.
64. Spencer Headworth & Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The Accused Poor, 44 SOC. JUST. 55, 58
(2017).
65. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 667.
66. Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 59, at 315. The Florida law in question
was enjoined by a federal district court, a decision upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Lebron v.
Secretary, Florida Department of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
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communities. They do so by both surveilling and setting explicit
boundaries around the lives of the poor.
a. Surveilling Poor Communities. Disparate enforcement of
general criminal prohibitions in poor communities is one way the
criminal legal system gains control over those with few financial and
social resources. Beginning in the 1970s, “the diffusion of crime control
techniques into the everyday lives of low-income African Americans
intensified as all urban social programs were increasingly integrated
into the bureaucracies, institutions, and industries at the heart of the
carceral state.”67 The result was what historian Heather Ann
Thompson calls the “criminalization of urban space”—“a process by
which increasing numbers of urban dwellers—overwhelmingly men
and women of color—became subject to a growing number of laws that
not only regulated bodies and communities in thoroughly new ways but
also subjected violators to unprecedented time behind bars.”68 Stopand-frisk policing, concentrated in low-income neighborhoods of color,
is one visible example of this pattern.69 The imposition of these
disparate policing and enforcement practices creates greater scrutiny
over the everyday lives of individuals in poor communities. Because
enforcement often leads to incarceration, surveillance and
enforcement policies can—and did—result in increased state physical
control over poorer, less educated, and non-white individuals.70
The controlling effects of such policies, however, go beyond mere
imprisonment because contact with the criminal legal system diffuses
through low-income communities. For example, widespread
misdemeanor charging has led to “ongoing entanglements with and
obligations to various organs of the criminal legal system—from police
to courts to private social service providers,”71 ultimately allowing the
penal power of the state to gain control over individuals as they live
their lives in the community. Probation and its attendant threats of
67. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 16 (2016).
68. Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline,
and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 706 (2010).
69. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as
a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2438 (2017).
70. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 40–43 (2006)
(noting that rates of violence and drug dealing fell among youth from poor families between 1980
and 2000, even as the incarceration rate of those individuals rose).
71. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 10 (2018).
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incarceration particularly trap poor individuals. At its peak in 2007, the
state and federal probation population soared to nearly 4.3 million
people.72 The probation system continues to account for more than half
of all those under correctional control in the United States.73 And the
obligations it imposes can be particularly difficult for poor and
disadvantaged probationers, who may have trouble finding required
full-time employment, taking time off work to attend needed
appointments, and paying the mandatory supervision fees.74 As a
result, probation effectively offers “a bifurcated pathway, diverting
relatively more privileged defendants toward community supervision
. . . while their less advantaged counterparts are funneled deeper into
the criminal legal system.”75
In part because of disparate policing practices, criminal
surveillance and enforcement is particularly concentrated in poor
communities. This is especially true in the context of public housing,
where the state acts as both property owner and police. Scholars have
noted that recipients of housing aid have “particularly circumscribed”
Fourth Amendment rights.76 These residents “are subject to extensive
scrutiny by law enforcement in the hallways, stairwells, courtyards, and
other common spaces of their homes—encounters that are simply
unimaginable in residences of the well-heeled and wealthy.”77 In 2014,
for example, the New York Police Department set up massive, blinding
floodlights at some of the city’s public-housing projects.78 The purpose,
as Mayor Bill de Blasio starkly put it, was to convey police’s

72. Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation and Inequality: Race, Class, and Gender Disparities
in Supervision and Revocation, in 2 HANDBOOK ON PUNISHMENT DECISIONS: LOCATIONS OF
DISPARITY 43, 43 (Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley eds., 2017).
73. Id. at 46.
74. Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism,
104 GEO. L.J. 291, 350 (2016); see also Phelps, supra note 72, at 48–49 (“For relatively
disadvantaged probationers, supervision may more often serve as a ‘piling on’ of sanctions that
ultimately ends with imprisonment.”).
75. Phelps, supra note 72, at 56.
76. See, e.g., Alexis Karteron, When Stop and Frisk Comes Home: Policing Public and
Patrolled Housing, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669, 670–71 (2019).
77. Id. at 671; see also Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401 (2003) (“Fourth Amendment protection varies depending
on the extent to which one can afford accoutrements of wealth such as a freestanding home,
fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and vision- and sound-proof doors and walls.”).
78. Barton Gellman & Sam Adler-Bell, The Disparate Impact of Surveillance, CENTURY
FOUND.
(Dec.
21,
2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/disparate-impact-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/W98S-2S7H].
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“omnipresence” in these communities.79 As with ordinances that
criminalize homelessness, policing practices that target public housing
ensure that those without the means to pay market rent “do not enjoy
the same freedom to move about their daily lives that most Americans
expect.”80
b. Scrutinizing Public-Benefits Recipients.
The pervasive
surveillance of low-income individuals and communities extends even
to areas where the state has no reason to suspect wrongdoing at the
outset. Primary among these is the oversight of public-benefits
recipients. Governments now require lengthy interviews as a condition
of receiving aid, drug test aid applicants, and routinely use the publicbenefits system as a source of information for general law enforcement
purposes. These means of control become so punitive that Professor
Gustafson calls them a kind of “degradation ceremony.”81
For decades, courts have grappled with the constitutional limits of
the inspection and oversight requirements that states and localities
impose on benefits recipients. In 1971, the Supreme Court held in
Wyman v. James82 that New York’s practice of requiring mandatory but
preannounced home visits from social workers as a condition of
receiving support did not violate Fourth Amendment prohibitions on
unreasonable searches and seizures—and perhaps did not even
constitute a search at all.83 The Court explicitly left open whether more
invasive practices—such as “early morning mass raid[s] upon homes of
welfare recipients”—might nonetheless be unconstitutional.84
But in the decades since, states have continued to intrude
extensively on the privacy of benefits recipients, occasionally with the
blessing of the courts. In Sanchez v. County of San Diego,85 for instance,
the Ninth Circuit held that the Public Assistance Fraud Division of the
county’s D.A. office could constitutionally use unannounced,

79. Id.
80. Karteron, supra note 76, at 673–74.
81. Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 59, at 301–04 (referencing the work of
sociologist Harold Garfinkel and “his notion of degradation ceremonies”).
82. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
83. Id. at 317–24 (“[W]e are not concerned here with any search by the New York social
service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term.”).
84. Id. at 326.
85. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
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warrantless visits to verify an applicant household’s eligibility.86
Although applicants were not required to allow the investigators into
their homes, withholding consent generally would result in a denial of
benefits.87 In a forceful dissent, Judge Fisher objected to the majority’s
favorable citation of case law from the criminal context—which
“suggest[ed] that welfare applicants may be treated the same as
convicted criminals.”88 Invasive oversight has permeated new contexts
in recent years, as aid recipients continue to be subject to criminal
scrutiny. For example, the Social Security Administration has
announced plans to use social media surveillance to identify potential
fraudulent disability claims.89
These patterns of scrutiny extend to many means-tested benefits
programs that serve indigent Americans. For example, Professor
Khiara Bridges has identified similar invasions of privacy in programs
offering prenatal care to poor women, who must endure “allencompassing” interviews with invasive questions about home life,
romantic partnerships, mental health problems, drug use, employment
status, and more.90 As Bridges notes, comparing poor recipients of
Medicaid to the often relatively wealthy recipients of farm subsidies,
“if the state treated other persons who receive government benefits the
same way that the state treats poor mothers who receive government
benefits, there would be a general sense of outrage.”91 Similar dynamics
underlie the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”), the federal
government’s largest antipoverty program.92 EITC recipients, who
earn on average less than $20,000 annually, now face the secondhighest IRS audit rate of any group of taxpayers—only slightly behind
the top 1 percent of all earners.93 These audits can lead to months-long
86. Id. at 919–20, 923 (“[Although] the home visits do not constitute searches under Wyman,
we agree with the district court that even if the home visits are searches under the Fourth
Amendment, they are reasonable.”).
87. Id. at 919.
88. Id. at 932 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
89. Robert Pear, On Disability and on Facebook? Uncle Sam Wants To Watch What You
Post, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/us/politics/social-securitydisability-trump-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/SA4M-WBZ6].
90. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 4 (2017).
91. Id. at 5.
92. Elizabeth Kneebone, Economic Recovery and the EITC: Expanding the Earned Income
Tax Credit To Benefit Families and Places, BROOKINGS (Jan. 26, 2009),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-recovery-and-the-eitc-expanding-the-earnedincome-tax-credit-to-benefit-families-and-places [https://perma.cc/T6QL-3B4D].
93. Paul Kiel, It’s Getting Worse: The IRS Now Audits Poor Americans at About the Same
(May
30,
2019,
10:16
AM),
Rate
As
the
Top
1%,
PROPUBLICA
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delays in refund processing and tend to discourage even eligible
individuals from reclaiming the much-needed credit.94
Law enforcement has used the reduced privacy rights of benefits
recipients to its advantage by focusing disproportionate amounts of
investigative resources on poorer individuals and communities.
Welfare records are available to law enforcement upon request,
without any probable cause requirement.95 Police and prosecutors use
such information to search for “fugitive felons”—further entangling
poor individuals with the criminal legal system and ultimately leading
those with very real economic need to lose access to benefits
programs.96 At times, law enforcement and welfare offices have even
more explicitly used the benefits system to ramp up law enforcement
activities against these poor recipients. In the late 1990s, for instance,
Operation Talon used food-stamp offices in thirty states and D.C. as
the site for criminal sting operations.97 These entanglements both
criminalize the act of receiving public benefits and ensure that those
poor enough to need such support face greater legal scrutiny.
Benefits programs’ eligibility requirements have also trained
additional law enforcement scrutiny on the poor. For example, states
have increasingly mandated drug testing as a condition for aid98—
capturing otherwise undetectable criminal acts when committed by the
poor. As Professor Gustafson has noted, drug-test requirements
“particularly highlight[] the conflation of poverty and crime and the
widespread assumption that poor women of color are the causes of
crime.”99 For this reason, courts have, under the Fourth Amendment,
put limits on some of the most extreme drug-testing regimes. For
example, a federal district court enjoined the application of Michigan’s

https://www.propublica.org/article/irs-now-audits-poor-americans-at-about-the-same-rate-asthe-top-1-percent [https://perma.cc/VKS2-MBB3].
94. Id.
95. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 669.
96. Id. at 667.
97. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-716, WELFARE REFORM:
IMPLEMENTATION OF FUGITIVE FELON PROVISIONS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 13 (2002);
Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 669–70.
98. Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the
Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 774 (2011) (noting that over half
the states considered drug-testing legislation between 2007 and 2009); Drug Testing for Welfare
Recipients and Public Assistance, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 24, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc
/M6HS-XKU5] (listing fifteen states that have enacted laws requiring drug testing or screening).
99. Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 680.
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broad testing statute in 2000,100 a decision that was affirmed following
an evenly split en banc rehearing in the Sixth Circuit.101 Likewise, in
Lebron v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children & Families,102 the
Eleventh Circuit invalidated a Florida law that would have required
drug testing for TANF applicants.103 The court explicitly addressed the
assumption of criminality underlying the policy, explaining “there is
nothing inherent to the condition of being impoverished that supports
the conclusion that there is a ‘concrete danger’ that impoverished
individuals are prone to drug use.”104 Even with these potential
constitutional limitations, more than a dozen states have passed
legislation to drug test aid applicants or recipients, with some regimes
applying only to applicants the state has a “reasonable suspicion”
might engage in illegal drug activity, and others applying more
broadly.105
Such drug-testing laws affect more than the applicants themselves.
The structures of benefits policing create, in effect, a system of
community control. In many cases, state and local enforcement
agencies—whether prosecutors or social-service workers—explicitly
rely on a network of informants to identify rulebreakers. As SNAP
fraud enforcement officers have reported, uncovering evidence of
intentional rulebreaking—which brings the harshest sanctions—
requires “creatively exploiting clients’ social networks,” either by
“exploit[ing] bad blood to cultivate cooperation” or otherwise
“directly co-opt[ing]” even positive interpersonal relationships.106
Other state programs have offered rewards for community members
who provide useful tips for fraud investigators.107 By exploiting social

100. See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“The Court
hereby . . . enjoins Defendant from conducting suspicionless drug testing of . . . applicants or
recipients, such a practice being an unconstitutional infringement of Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment rights.” (emphasis omitted)).
101. See Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
102. Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 1218.
104. Id. at 1213 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
105. See Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, supra note 98.
106. Spencer Headworth, Getting To Know You: Welfare Fraud Investigation and the
Appropriation of Social Ties, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 173 (2019).
107. See Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 59, at 308–09 (describing a Riverside
County Department of Social Services newspaper advertisement that functioned as a “shaming
device” by listing names of individuals convicted of welfare fraud and offering $100 rewards for
tips).
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ties, these programs entangle entire communities in the mechanisms of
the criminal legal system.
Programs that condition aid on the imposition of criminal scrutiny
justify these invasions in three ways. First, defenders argue that even
the criminal-surveillance aspects of these programs ultimately aid
beneficiaries. The Supreme Court contemplated such a justification in
Wyman v. James, when it upheld a program mandating interviews with
Department of Social Service workers as a condition of aid.108 The
Court emphasized that, under federal and state law, the visiting social
workers’ “primary objective is, or should be, the welfare . . . of the aid
recipient”—including a focus on assistance and rehabilitation.109
Second, these programs rely on the fiction that beneficiaries
voluntarily consent to scrutiny by mere participation in the program.
But, as the dissenting Ninth Circuit judge noted in Sanchez, “where
government aid is an important means of providing food, shelter and
clothing to a family, the coercive nature” of invasive requirements like
home visits may “render[] the notion of consent effectively
meaningless.”110 Finally, some of these programs justify excessive
scrutiny by offering access to social-services benefits only to those who
have already admitted criminal wrongdoing. For instance,
prosecutorial diversion programs, which may offer clinical
interventions on mental health and addiction, often condition access to
classes and counseling on a preliminary admission of guilt.111 These
programs effectively condition receipt of necessary aid on an admission
of criminal guilt. In turn, these extracted confessions can then be used
against participants who fail out of the program—often for something
as minor as missing an expensive drug test or failing to pay the hefty
fees imposed by private providers.112 In an even more extreme

108. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
109. Id. at 319, 322–23.
110. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 942 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., dissenting);
see also Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217 (11th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting a Florida law that “essentially require[d] a TANF applicant to choose between
exercising his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches” and “life-sustaining
financial assistance”).
111. See Lee Romney, Private Diversion Programs Are Failing Those Who Need Help the
Most, REVEAL (May 31, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/private-diversion-programsare-failing-those-who-need-help-the-most [https://perma.cc/KTV3-GFT9] (describing one man’s
choice between completing the diversionary program or being charged with a felony).
112. Id.; see also Rebecca Burns, Diversion Programs Say They Offer a Path away from Court,
But Critics Say the Tolls Are Hefty, PROPUBLICA ILL. (Nov. 13, 2018, 4:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/diversion-programs-illinois-criminal-justice-system-bounceback-
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example, legislators who supported a 2013 Tennessee “fetal assault”
law—criminalizing the in-utero transmission of illegally obtained
opioids—explicitly cited the provision of social support and
rehabilitation as a justification for a new substantive criminal
prohibition.113 Here, again, the state uses the criminal process to
control poor individuals by offering the carrot of necessary aid
alongside the stick of surveillance and punitive sanctions.
3. Criminalization as Hierarchy. Mechanisms of criminal legal
enforcement that disproportionately punish and control the poorest
Americans work to solidify hierarchies based on class, race, and
gender. Social ossification has been an implicit function of a wide range
of criminal legal regimes. The loitering and vagrancy laws struck down
in cases like Papachristou are one example. These deliberately vague
laws became “the go-to response to anyone who threatened to move
‘out of place’ . . . whether that be socially, culturally, politically, racially,
sexually, economically, or spatially.”114 These “roving license[s] to
arrest”115 have fallen out of constitutional favor.116 But mechanisms to
check those who threaten the social order remain central to the
criminalization of low-income parents, beneficiaries of government
programs, and other people living in poverty who are forced to live in
the shadow of criminal control.
In particular, the criminalization of poverty has long been used as
a mechanism to enforce America’s racial caste system. Vagrancy laws
and other widely applicable criminal prohibitions served this purpose
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Before the Civil
War, vagrancy laws in southern states either explicitly targeted or
imposed harsher punishments on free Blacks, who posed a threat to
the racial order underpinning slavery.117 Even after the official fall of
slavery, southern counties continued to deploy disproportionate
criminal sentences to effectively reinforce racial hierarchy in the

correctivesolutions [https://perma.cc/WD6G-V7KG] (expressing concern that diversion
programs create an unequal system between poor defendants and those able to pay the fees).
113. Wendy A. Bach, Prosecuting Poverty, Criminalizing Care, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 809,
843–44 (2019).
114. Risa L. Goluboff, Before Black Lives Matter, SLATE (Mar. 2, 2016, 12:21 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/03/vagrancy-laws-and-the-legacy-of-the-civil-rightsmovement.html [https://perma.cc/9CJP-AYL3].
115. Id.
116. GOLUBOFF, supra note 25, at 338–39.
117. Id. at 115.
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postbellum period.118 As Professor Christopher Muller found in his
study of post–Civil War Georgia, the system of “convict leas[ing]” was
most prevalent in areas where the racial caste system was most under
siege—“[w]here African-Americans achieved a degree of economic
independence by moving to cities or acquiring land,” thus
“threaten[ing] the ideology and economic position of poor whites and
elite white landowners alike.”119
Throughout the twentieth century, too, vagrancy laws that
criminalized poverty were enforced most stringently against those who
sought to upend the Black–white hierarchy. Some were used to police
interracial sex: four of the defendants in Papachristou, for example,
had been arrested for vagrancy while traveling in the car in a mixedrace, mixed-gender group.120 Others were deployed to punish those
who attacked the racial hierarchy more explicitly. For example, civil
rights leader Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth was arrested for loitering
and sentenced to 180 days of hard labor, a $100 fine, and costs.121
Between 1958 and 1966, sixty-five separate cases concerning sit-ins and
civil rights protests—many involving challenges to vagrancy, loitering,
or breach-of-peace arrests—reached oral argument at the Supreme
Court.122 The number and context of these challenges to vagrancy
arrests demonstrates how they served as a means of enforcing
hierarchy—whether based on class, gender, race, or political point of
view.
With the constitutional downfall of both vagrancy laws and
explicit racial segregation, legal structures that recreate race–class
hierarchies have taken on new forms. For instance, enforcement of
local quality-of-life ordinances to target recipients of housing-choice
vouchers—which subsidize low-income families’ rental of private

118. Christopher Muller, Freedom and Convict Leasing in the Postbellum South, 124 AM. J.
SOC. 367, 375–78 (2018).
119. Id. at 377, 396.
120. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 25, at 304 (noting that although the four occupants of the
vehicle were arrested for vagrancy, had the two white female occupants been the only two present
there was “no doubt they would not have been arrested”).
121. Id. at 139. In a narrow opinion, the Supreme Court found that the city ordinances had
been unconstitutionally applied to Reverend Shuttlesworth and invalidated his convictions. See
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 92, 95 (1965).
122. GOLUBOFF, supra note 25, at 139, 141 (quoting NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer
Jack Greenberg’s reflection on “so many trespass, breach of the peace, disorderly conduct and
weight of evidence cases” the Supreme Court heard during the height of the civil rights
movement).



1496

   

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

  





[Vol. 69:1473

housing123—can be used to code and maintain white spaces.124 Professor
Norrinda Brown Hayat argues that a range of overlapping policies
allow neighborhoods and towns to defend whiteness—including
“surveillance, levying of fines, criminal investigations and
prosecutions, denial of public services, and the institution of ordinances
designed to penalize landlords for renting to voucher holders.”125
Hayat thus posits that these facially neutral policies designed to
“enforce” municipal codes serve the same function as the “[o]vertly
racist conduct designed to intimidate black newcomers” that the Fair
Housing Act outlawed.126
At base, laws that criminalize the lives of impoverished Americans
have a cyclical effect. They punish individuals for failing to comply with
full participation in the profoundly precarious and insecure low-wage
labor market while imposing restrictions that make such conformity
impossible, if it were desirable.127 Scholars have identified mechanisms
of hierarchical control in nuisance laws, occupational-licensing
regimes, and the child-welfare system.128 Through this “systemic
phenomenon” of largely local and state laws, these policies “stunt[]
upward mobility and contribut[e] to the perpetuation of poverty.”129
B. The Procedural Approach to the Criminalization of Poverty
In this Section, we discuss how due-process-based analyses
became the central constitutional pathway for redress of poverty
123. See Emily Badger, How Section 8 Became a ‘Racial Slur,’ WASH. POST (June 15, 2015,
7:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/15/how-section-8-became-aracial-slur [https://perma.cc/YLU4-WCH2].
124. See Williams v. City of Antioch, No. C 08-02301, 2010 WL 3632197, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 2, 2010) (describing allegations that the City of Antioch and its police department created a
special unit to deal with “quality of life” issues, with enforcement targeted at Section 8 voucher
recipients).
125. Norrinda Brown Hayat, Section 8 Is the New N-Word: Policing Integration in the Age of
Black Mobility, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 69–70 (2016).
126. Id. at 64.
127. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary
Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 930–35 (2016) (describing
community supervision, criminal legal debt, and child-support enforcement as ways that current
law provides authority to incarcerate people for nonwork and to subsequently force them to
work). Other scholars have explained that engagement in formal paid work has become a moral
requisite for welfare receipt. See, e.g., David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the
Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2060 (2004); Noah D. Zatz, Poverty
Unmodified?: Critical Reflections on the Deserving/Undeserving Distinction, 59 UCLA L. REV.
550, 560–61 (2012). It is also, correspondingly, necessary for avoiding criminal legal surveillance.
128. See, e.g., Greene, A Theory of Poverty, supra note 24, at 771, 775, 778.
129. Id. at 758.
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criminalization and describe how civil rights litigators have creatively
used the Due Process Clause to address some aspects of poverty
criminalization post-Ferguson. We applaud those successes but also
point out the fundamental conceptual and practical shortcomings of
these approaches.
1. The Development and Shortcomings of a Language of Process.
The mid-twentieth century marked what some scholars have dubbed
the Supreme Court’s “egalitarian revolution,”130 characterized by the
Court’s “broadening and deepening [of] the constitutional significance
of our national commitment to Equality.”131 During this period, “[t]he
growing influence of egalitarianism [was] . . . exemplified by decisions
concerning the administration of criminal justice.”132 A particular focus
was the equality of access to justice. For instance, in Stack v. Boyle,133
the Court held that “the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must
be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the
presence of that defendant,”134 including “the financial ability of the
defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”135 This case
was an early example of the Court’s emphasis on individualized
adjudication as the primary protection for the poor against arbitrary
punishment. Later, in cases like Gideon v. Wainwright136 and Griffin v.
Illinois,137 the Court began to speak more broadly of the importance of
“[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich.”138 In each of these cases,
the Court emphasized notions of “equal justice,”139 which here meant

130. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term: Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144–
45 (1964).
131. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term: Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
132. Id. at 92.
133. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
134. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 5 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c)).
136. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants have a
constitutional right to the assistance of state-provided legal counsel in a criminal trial).
137. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that the failure to provide defendants with
transcripts necessary to pursue an appeal free of cost implicated due process and equal protection
concerns).
138. Id. at 16; see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (identifying
“discrimination against the indigent” due to a lack of counsel as an impermissible “evil”).
139. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.”); accord Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“[E]very defendant
stands equal before the law.”).
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ensuring that criminal defendants were afforded appropriate
procedural protections and access to the resources of the justice system
to avail themselves of their substantive rights.
The Court built on this framework in a series of 1970s-era
decisions that established today’s procedural limits on the ability of
LFOs to result in the imprisonment of indigent defendants. In Williams
v. Illinois,140 the Court held that the extension of a maximum prison
term due to a defendant’s inability to pay a fine “work[ed] an invidious
discrimination solely because he is unable to pay the fine.”141 The Court
concluded that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on
imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all
defendants irrespective of their economic status.”142 Later, in Tate v.
Short,143 the Court employed the same equal protection analysis to find
that “the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a
sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely
because the defendant is indigent.”144
Thus, at the outset the guarantors of “equal justice for poor and
rich” were the “constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection[,] both [of which] call for procedures in criminal trials which
allow no invidious discriminations between persons.”145 But when the
Court had the opportunity to extend a general grant of protection
based purely on notions of equality to state practices that
disproportionately harmed the indigent, it declined to do so. Instead,
in the well-known case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,146 the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not
require applying strict scrutiny to instances of wealth-based
discrimination.147 This limit upon equal protection doctrine148 left due

140. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
141. Id. at 242.
142. Id. at 244.
143. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
144. Id. at 398 (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)).
145. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (emphasis added).
146. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
147. Id. at 55.
148. Id. at 29 (“[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone
provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”); see also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (finding, in a case where welfare recipients were unable to afford the
necessary filing fee to challenge a reduction of their benefits, that “[n]o suspect classification, such
as race, nationality, or alienage, is present”).
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process as the central viable alternative pathway toward constitutional
protection of the poor.
In Bearden v. Georgia, the Court solidified its reliance on
procedural safeguards to secure protections for indigent defendants.
Bearden involved a challenge by a defendant, Danny Bearden, who
was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay a $500 criminal fine and
$250 in restitution.149 Bearden was able to make the first two payments
on his debt after borrowing $200 from his parents, but shortly
thereafter Bearden lost his job.150 Though he continued to search for
work, he quickly fell behind on his payments.151 Consequently,
Bearden notified his probation officer that “he was going to be late
with his [next] payment because he could not find a job.”152 Three
months after the missed payment, the state filed a petition to revoke
Bearden’s probation based on his failure to pay the balance of his court
costs.153 After an evidentiary hearing before a trial judge, his probation
was revoked.154
The Supreme Court found that the trial court had improperly
revoked Bearden’s probation because the court failed to make any
findings about Bearden’s ability to pay his outstanding debt.155 The
Court explained its ruling in terms of the deficiency in the process the
trial court afforded Bearden:
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant’s
financial background can play in determining an appropriate
sentence. When the court is initially considering what sentence to
impose, a defendant’s level of financial resources is a point on a
spectrum rather than a classification. Since indigency in this context
is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting “the problem of
this case into an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean
to be rationally accomplished[.]” The more appropriate question is
whether consideration of a defendant’s financial background in

149. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662 (1983).
150. Id. at 662–63.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 663.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 674 (“By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could not pay
the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the
fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically
turned a fine into a prison sentence.”).
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setting or resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial
of due process.156

To be sure, the Court acknowledged that its analysis is informed
by principles of equality. The Court also explained that “[w]hether
analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot
be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather
requires a careful inquiry into” the government’s ends and means.157 At
base, however, the Court determined that, as a practical matter, the
equality of rich and poor would be enforced through procedural
safeguards, rather than freestanding notions of equality.
Today, following the Court’s lead, much of the discourse on the
“criminalization of poverty” is written in the language of due process.
In both litigation and in the academic literature, process-based values
do much of the work in identifying and addressing problems with the
criminalization of poverty. This shift embodies an increased emphasis
on individualized liberty over collective equality as the operative
protection for defendants. Yet the promise of meaningful equality via
a process-based approach remains largely unrealized, in part because
of the conceptual limits of an individualized-liberty-based approach.
Recent research has catalogued the numerous recurring
procedural failures that have contributed to the continued prevalence
of “modern-day debtors’ prisons” despite the protections laid out in
Bearden.158 The ACLU, for instance, has identified five particular
practices that result in the poor being jailed for failure to pay off
LFOs.159 These include offering defendants “the false ‘choice’ of
immediately paying a certain amount of money in fines and fees or
156. Id. at 666 n.8 (citation omitted) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723
(1969)).
157. Id. at 666–67 (footnote omitted). For a broader discussion of the interplay between equal
protection and due process in the Court’s Bearden decision, see generally Kerry Abrams &
Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2007) (describing
more generally the analytic process of reading rights clauses together to expand traditional
rights). See also generally Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 397 (2020) (examining the relationship between wealth, equal protection, and
due process).
158. See Jaclyn Kurin, Indebted to Injustice: The Meaning of “Willfulness” in a Georgia v.
Bearden Ability To Pay Hearing, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 265, 267 (2017) (cataloging
procedural defects after Bearden that have resulted in increased incarceration of the poor).
159. NUSRAT CHOUDHURY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WRITTEN STATEMENT BEFORE
THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEARING ON MUNICIPAL POLICING AND COURTS: A
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE OR A QUEST FOR REVENUE 8–11 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_statement_usccr_03182016_municipal_courts_and_police
_choudhury.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT6M-U4RB].
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going to jail” without an ability-to-pay hearing; threatening defendants
with immediate courthouse detention for failure to pay after
sentencing; the use of for-profit probation companies; execution of
failure-to-pay warrants; and forcing debtors to perform manual labor
to cover LFOs without an appropriate ability-to-pay hearing.160 For
each of these practices, it appears that the procedures required by
Bearden have failed to promote the individualized attention for
indigent defendants that they were intended to. Thus, Bearden’s
emphasis on procedure fails to promote equality partly because it does
not ensure that the procedures themselves are consistent enough to
fulfill the Supreme Court’s desire that sufficient process can act as a
defense against arbitrary punishment of the poor simply for being poor.
On a much broader level, a process-based approach offers little
possibility of relief for the substantive and structural criminalization of
poverty that we describe in Section A: due process addresses
procedural issues once a case is before the court. It does not at this
point offer redress for substantive and structural issues that criminalize
poverty by dictating who is before the court.161
2. Process and Litigation in the Post-Ferguson Era. After the
Department of Justice’s investigation in Ferguson, the criminalizationof-poverty framework has increasingly focused on the specific issue of
incarceration due to bail, fines, and fees. Although the consequences
of financial penalties in criminal cases had been studied before,162
Ferguson for the first time prominently revealed to the world the ways
in which cash-strapped cities might try to fund their survival by
charging residents steep fines and fees and incarcerating them when
they cannot pay. As a consequence, the criminalization-of-poverty
framework has increasingly emphasized the entanglement of criminal
law, impoverished defendants, and the reinforcing effects of these

160. Id.; see also Kurin, supra note 158, at 277–82.
161. See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, Hidden Laws of the Time of Ferguson, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 1,
8–15 (2018) [hereinafter Bell, Hidden Laws] (exploring “the myriad pathways through which
poverty and involvement in the carceral state are linked”).
162. See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for
Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 323, 335–39 (2009); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 381–84 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil
Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2012)
[hereinafter Chin, The New Civil Death].
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monetary sanctions.163 Now, a new wave of litigation has sprung up to
challenge local practices that incarcerate low-income debtors who
cannot afford to pay their criminal sanctions.164 The resulting court
decisions, and much of the academic and advocacy community’s
analysis of them, adopt and thus reinforce the procedural lens through
which the criminalization of poverty is conceptualized.
For example, in Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court held that “the
fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that
defendant,”165 including “the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of
the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”166 This
standard comports with the Court’s doctrinal emphasis on procedure
and individualized adjudication as the mechanisms through which
indigent defendants can ensure equality in their criminal-legal-system
outcomes despite the inequality in their status.
However, recent studies in pretrial detention and bail raise
concerns about whether the procedures defendants receive actually
live up to this standard. For example, pretrial detention and bail
hearings have been reported to last only a few minutes in some

163. The criminalization-of-poverty framework has frequently emphasized two distinct but
related phenomena in which the poor find themselves entangled in the criminal legal system by
mere fact of being poor and then, in turn, become poorer due to these brushes with the system.
Professor Kaaryn Gustafson’s scholarship examines the first issue by highlighting the introduction
of criminal legal and surveillance paradigms into the distribution of means-tested benefits such as
cash welfare. See Gustafson, Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 20, at 646 (describing the
motivation and effects of this entanglement). Professor Alexandra Natapoff’s research focuses on
the second issue, exploring ways in which criminal lawyers and civil servants reflect the tight
connection between criminalization and poverty, reinforcing the role that the criminal system
plays in the lives of the poor. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the
Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 445 (2015).
164. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 F. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017); Bice v. La. Pub.
Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2012); Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-04959,
2016 WL 6025486 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016); Cain v. City of New Orleans, 184 F. Supp. 3d 349
(E.D. La. 2016); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn.
2015); Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15-cv-00182, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015);
Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 15-cv-570, 2015 WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Fant v.
City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015); Class Action Complaint, Jenkins v. City
of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015).
165. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
166. Id. at 5 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c)).
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jurisdictions,167 often without the aid of counsel.168 Such practices
frequently result in disproportionate levels of pretrial detention for
poor defendants169 and people of color.170 Pretrial detentions then often
lead to severe collateral consequences, including loss of employment,
housing, or child custody.171 Such detentions also have a significant
substantive impact on trial outcomes, including length of incarceration
and non-bail court fees owed.172
Academics and advocates alike have largely responded to
concerns about pretrial detention by further embracing a language of
procedure. Organizations such as the Pretrial Justice Institute
encourage courts to rely on actuarial pretrial risk assessments to
determine bail and pretrial detention.173 In an article about the effects

167. See James Asher et al., Unequal Treatment: A Series: Bent on Bail, INJUSTICE WATCH
(Oct. 14, 2016), http://injusticewatch.org/interactives/bent-on-bail [https://perma.cc/NS2F-VSHB]
(noting that bail hearings in Illinois’s Cook County often took less than two minutes and, at times,
lasted less than one minute); Length of a Bail Hearing in North Dakota: 3 Minutes, NAT’L CTR.
FOR ACCESS TO JUST. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://ncforaj.org/2013/01/25/length-of-a-bail-hearing-innorth-dakota-3-minutes [https://perma.cc/BZR2-T7QZ] (noting that North Dakota bail hearings
last three minutes on average).
168. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., 2009 SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 45 (2009),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=5baadb7d-8fba-c259-c54d-4c6587e03201&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/5ND2-M5JW]
(finding that over half of pretrial court appearances occurred over video without the presence of
defense counsel).
169. MARIE VANNOSTRAND, LUMINOSITY, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS 13
(2013),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/New_Jersey_Jail_Population_Analysis_
March_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XMX-FDG4] (finding that 12 percent of the entire pretrial
population of New Jersey jails was unable to make bail of $2500 or less—and often could not
afford amounts of $500 or less—resulting in their detention prior to trial).
170. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT
MIDYEAR
2014,
at
1
(2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZ9L-XSU6] (finding that Black and Latinx Americans together represent 50
percent of all pretrial detainees in the United States).
171. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 162, at 1791.
172. See Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability To Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 513 (2018) (finding that pretrial detention leads to a 42
percent increase in the length of the incarceration sentence and a 41 percent increase in the
amount of nonbail court fees owed); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (“[I]f a
defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or
otherwise prepare his defense.”). For a review of the empirical studies examining the effects of
pretrial detention on criminal legal outcomes, see Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan
Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV.
711, 724–29 (2017).
173. (Evidence-Based, Actuarial Pretrial) Risk Assessment, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Aug. 9,
2017),
https://www.pretrial.org/evidence-based-actuarial-pretrial-risk-assessment
[https://perma.cc/83GN-AXHU]. But see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 216–23 (2007) (critiquing the
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of pretrial detention in misdemeanor cases, Professors Paul Heaton,
Sandra Mayson, and Megan Stevenson also argue that pretrial bailsetting hearings should be considered a “critical stage” of a criminal
proceeding, thereby guaranteeing a right to effective assistance of
counsel for the accused.174
Others have similarly argued for the expansion of procedures
earlier in court processes. For example, Professor Beth Colgan’s work
on graduated economic sanctions175 and the Excessive Fines Clause176
calls for a reexamination of the Court’s historically narrow
conceptualization of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
excessive fines. Colgan argues for new policies that would take into
account the accused’s ability to pay at the outset with the calculation
of the initial fine.177 Proposals like these promote the procedural value
of individualized adjudication, explicitly taking into account each
defendant’s income and means from the very beginning of
adjudication.
Another focus, both in the literature and in litigation, has been on
the failures of process related to collateral consequences of fine and fee
nonpayment. One area of litigation concerns state laws that permit the
suspension of drivers’ licenses for failures to pay traffic fines, to appear
in court, or even to provide child support.178 Because drivers’ licenses
are protected property interests, the procedures for revoking them are
subject to procedural due process requirements under the Fourteenth
Amendment.179 As such, many of the challenges against state policies
that suspend drivers’ licenses for nonpayment of LFOs have focused

racial bias embedded within the actuarial risk assessment tools used at the pretrial stage, even
those that have appeared to produce progressive reform); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out,
128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (critiquing prediction at a more general level because it uses the
past to predict the future). Note that numerous scholars have offered a similar critique of actuarial
risk assessment at other stages of the criminal legal process—far too many to cite adequately in
this short Article.
174. Heaton et al., supra note 172, at 777.
175. Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability To Pay, 103 IOWA
L. REV. 53, 54–57 (2017).
176. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 337–47
(2014).
177. Id. at 345–47.
178. See MARIO SALAS & ANGELA CIOLFI, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR., DRIVEN BY DOLLARS:
A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION LAWS FOR FAILURE TO PAY
COURT DEBT 1 (2017); Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target the
Poor, NPR (Jan. 5, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-driverslicense-suspensions-unfairly-target-the-poor [https://perma.cc/A4EV-25BP].
179. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
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on Bearden and the procedural due process balancing test articulated
in Mathews v. Eldridge.180 The Department of Justice has also argued
that “suspending the driver’s licenses of those who fail to pay fines or
fees without inquiring into whether that failure to pay was willful or
instead the result of an inability to pay may result in penalizing indigent
individuals solely because of their poverty” in violation of Bearden.181
Importantly, some courts have begun to take note of some of the
disparate impacts of pretrial detention and bail on poor defendants and
have taken steps to address them through a process-based approach. A
prominent example is ODonnell v. Harris County, in which the Fifth
Circuit observed the unequal treatment that impoverished defendants
face:
[T]ake two . . . arrestees who are identical in every way—same charge,
same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc.—except that
one is wealthy and one is indigent. . . . One arrestee is able to post
bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less
likely to plead guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be
acquitted, and less likely to bear the social costs of incarceration. The
poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply
because he has less money than his wealthy counterpart.182

The Fifth Circuit ultimately found that Harris County’s cash-bail
system violated the Due Process Clause.183 Although local rules
required individualized assessment of bail, the “unwritten custom and
practice that was marred by gross inefficiencies[] did not achieve any
individualized assessment in setting bail, and was incompetent to do
so.”184 Other courts have similarly held local cash-bail schemes to be
impermissible on due process grounds. For example, the Ninth Circuit
found that due process requires a Bearden-like inquiry into a detainee’s
financial circumstances when setting their conditions of release.185
180. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). For example, in a challenge brought in
North Carolina, plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the state’s law, which does not require a
predeprivation hearing before revocation of a driver’s license, violates equal protection as well as
due process under Bearden. Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619, 623 (M.D.N.C. 2019), appeal
filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019). For a more in-depth discussion of the due process and
equal protection arguments at play in these cases, see generally Garrett, supra note 157.
181. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1–2, Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d
653 (W.D. Va. 2019) (No. 3:16-cv-00044), 2016 WL 6892275.
182. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 2018).
183. Id. at 152.
184. Id. at 153.
185. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Is consideration of the
detainees’ financial circumstances, as well as of possible alternative release conditions, necessary
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Sociologist Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve argues that, in Chicagoarea criminal courts, court proceedings are a mere “‘ceremonial
charade,’ in which due process is reduced to ceremony without
substance for those deemed to be undeserving.”186 Individualized
assessment through ability-to-pay hearings is important, and we
support advocacy to expand its scope. But individualized assessment
does not intervene upon the most powerful mechanisms through which
the legal system penalizes poverty. These hearings are not necessarily
“charades” in all cases. However, they may sometimes be red
herrings.187
While the procedural lens is sometimes helpful in securing relief
for indigent litigants and offers promise in some additional areas of
criminal law related to fines and fees, the central concern of this Article
is that it is woefully incomplete. The remedies available in these cases
cannot reach the deeper structural and substantive issues of poverty
criminalization described in Section I.A. The language of process often
leaves courts without a vocabulary that would demand eradication of
the substantive link between poverty and legal social control. When the
legal debate turns solely upon issues of process, process-based and
jurisdictional claims compete on similar moral terrain with the processbased concerns of poor litigants.188 Courts can grant or deny relief to
indigent defendants without having to address—or even mention—the
weighty issues of substantive and structural inequality that are truly at
the heart of the cases before them.

to ensure that the conditions of their release will be reasonably related to the governmental
interest in ensuring their appearance at future hearings? We conclude that the answer is yes.”
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a due process
violation where points were added to a defendant’s criminal history for sentencing-guideline
purposes solely because of the defendant’s inability to pay LFOs).
186. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 73 (2016).
187. The entire system of indigent defense can be criticized as designed to imprison the poor:
The reason that prisons are filled with poor people, and that rich people rarely go to
prison, is not because the rich have better lawyers than the poor. It is because prison is
for the poor, and not the rich. . . . This is the real crisis of indigent defense. Gideon
obscures this reality, and in this sense stands in the way of the political mobilization
that will be required to transform criminal justice.
Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2178
(2013).
188. See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283,
2322 (2018) (explaining that jurisdictional federal court doctrines have sometimes been deployed
to prevent courts from hearing substantively meritorious criminalization-of-poverty claims).
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II. SKETCHES OF A DEMOSPRUDENCE OF POVERTY
This Part moves from the diagnostic to the normative and
considers how judges can use the tools immediately at their disposal to
meet their ethical obligation to promote substantive justice.189 Judges
of course cannot, on their own, address the morass that we describe in
Part I. We write this Article with recognition and appreciation of the
indispensability of movements that would fundamentally restructure
poverty in America and the carceral institutions that punish and
reproduce it. Yet, from a pragmatic perspective, we recognize that in
the status quo, judges are powerful system actors that can—while
adhering to current doctrine—work in important ways to recognize and
lay a foundation for disentangling substantive and structural poverty
criminalization. Accordingly, we do not intend to offer a
comprehensive plan of action for these problems. Rather, this proposal
is the start of a much longer conversation about concrete ways legal
elites can engage in analytic and case-management strategies that
observe and address the realities of poverty even when traditional
doctrine truncates the possibility of legal intervention.
This Article draws from the concept of “demosprudence”190 to
propose that judges use multiple platforms to acknowledge the deep
interconnection between conditions of poverty and the substantive,
structural, and procedural pathways of legal marginalization. Judging
is not merely the rendering of decisions based on preexisting legal
rules; it can also encompass the articulation of legal values, the
management of courtrooms, the making of rules about broader judicial
operation, and the representation of the ethical principles of the legal
system. While judges are bound to apply the law, judges also have an
ethical obligation to prevent systematic bias in the legal system on the
basis of poverty.191 Our analysis to this point has underscored that
systematic bias is pervasive in courtrooms and in the legal system
generally and shown that this bias is structured in a way that current
doctrine does not recognize and thus cannot remedy. The prescriptions
we sketch below are a first step toward meeting the often-overlooked
duty of bias reduction.

189. See Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24–36 (2007)
(describing judges’ ethical obligation to promote actual justice).
190. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 16, at 47–52; Guinier &
Torres, supra note 14, at 2749–56.
191. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
137, 144–46 (2013).
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A. Demosprudence Revisited
This Section situates demosprudence within judicial theory and
judicial ethics. The relationship between judging and demosprudence
is murky. This murkiness is partly due to concerns about institutional
roles and competencies, which are discussed further in Part III.
However, this murkiness is also a product of demosprudential theory’s
general ambivalence toward adjudication. Professor Guinier’s initial
articulation of the theory described demosprudence as “a democracyenhancing jurisprudence” that “describes lawmaking or legal practices
that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the people.”192 Yet,
later articulations defined demosprudence in opposition to
jurisprudence. Most notably, Guinier and Professor Gerald Torres, in
a 2014 essay, contrasted liberal civil rights jurisprudence—which
“examines the extent to which the rights of ‘discrete and insular’
minorities are protected by judges interpreting ordinary legal and
constitutional doctrine”—with demosprudence—which “explores the
ways that political, economic, or social minorities cannot simply rely on
judicial decisions as the solution to their problems.”193 Instead of
focusing on the actions of judges, Guinier and Torres explain,
demosprudence “requires us to ask two overarching questions: (1)
How and when do disadvantaged or weak minorities . . . mobilize to
protect their own rights in a majoritarian democracy?; and (2) Does
the mobilization of these constituencies have a democracy-enhancing
effect?”194

192. Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 16, at 15–16. Corresponding ideas
focus on processes of legal mobilization through cultural change in community, or what Professor
Robert Cover famously referred to as “jurisgenesis.” See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court
1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–14 (1983); see also George
I. Lovell, Michael McCann & Kirstine Taylor, Covering Legal Mobilization: A Bottom-Up
Analysis of Wards Cove v. Atonio, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 61 (2016) (“[C]oncepts of
jurisgenesis and jurispathy can enrich the legal mobilization framework for understanding law
and social change.”).
193. Guinier & Torres, supra note 14, at 2749.
194. Id. An important body of work in the field of law and social movements has taken up the
mantle of exploring demosprudence by nonjudicial actors, including movement lawyers. See, e.g.,
I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1280 (2017) (arguing
that videos of police stops represent a way that technology can be used demosprudentially to
educate judges about how police stops actually occur); Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1654–60; Justin Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial: Ethics for
Movement Lawyers, in Ferguson and Beyond, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2057, 2062–66 (2017)
[hereinafter Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial]; Anthony Michael Kreis, Marriage
Demosprudence, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1679, 1683 (describing how social movements helped shape
family law); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 986–87 (2010)
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This Article proposes a midrange alternative between a
perspective that treats judges as the quintessential legal-rights
protectors and one that shifts analytic focus away from judges
altogether. Our alternative returns to Guinier’s earlier approach to
demosprudence. In that view, demosprudence “is not concerned
primarily with the logical reasoning or legal principles that animate and
justify a judicial opinion” and “is instead focused on enhancing the
democratic potential of the work of lawyers, judges, and other legal
elites.”195
Guinier originally described judicial opinions, specifically oral
dissents, as demosprudential if they satisfied one or more of the
following characteristics: (1) the opinion “probes or tests a particular
understanding of democracy” by “engag[ing] with a core issue of
democratic legitimacy, democratic accountability, democratic
structure, or democratic viability”; (2) it breaks from the usual logical
structure of judicial opinions, perhaps engaging in storytelling, using
poetic language, or developing some other emotionally stirring
rhetorical technique; and (3) it is directed to tasks beyond resolution
of a single case and speaks to legal actors outside the courts.196 Several
scholars have described dissenting opinions by Supreme Court Justices
as acts of demosprudence, given their frequent criticism of highly
(describing movement lawyers’ decisions to litigate marriage-equality cases between Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), as reflecting a
position that “[l]oss, rather than the litigation itself, crystallizes the deprivation of rights and the
unequal treatment that the movement is fighting”); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification,
115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 621–22 (2017) (describing collective organizing to create community bail
funds as a form of demosprudence that inserts a community perspective into criminal court
processing); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 287 (2019) (describing demosprudence in part as “laypeople join[ing] collectively to
contest meanings of justice”).
195. Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 16, at 16.
196. Id. at 49; see also Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics
Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 540–42 (2009) (describing the demosprudential dissent by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the Lilly Ledbetter case on sex discrimination in pay for employment).
In the “public story” aspect of demosprudence, Guinier drew from storytelling scholar Marshall
Ganz’s insight that effective narratives speak to shared experiences that connect the speaker—
here, the court—with the listener—here, the public—and thus bridge the usual divides in social
life. This allows the listener to connect emotionally, thus making public narratives more
motivational and normatively powerful than other forms of storytelling. See Marshall Ganz,
Public Narrative, Collective Action, and Power, in ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PUBLIC
OPINION: FROM INERTIA TO PUBLIC ACTION 273, 280–81 (Sina Odugbemi & Taeku Lee eds.,
2011); see also Cover, supra note 192, at 10 (“The intelligibility of normative behavior inheres in
the communal character of the narratives that provide the context of that behavior. . . . The part
that you or I choose to play may be singular, but the fact that we can locate it in a common ‘script’
renders it ‘sane’ . . . .”).
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formalistic approaches to legal analysis that omit relevant social
context.197
Other scholars have expanded on this definition of
demosprudence by focusing on the behavior of judges or the
interpretation of current law. For example, Professor Brian Ray argues
that judicial demosprudence extends to the use of rhetoric in majority
opinions to “invok[e] the tragic consequences of insufficient policies”
and to construct narratives that promote long-term policy deliberation
between the political branches and the government.198 He contends
that this judicial demosprudence is highly valuable to social movements
in countries with relatively young constitutional cultures, such as South
Africa.199 Professor Justin Long has applied the concept of
demosprudence to interactive federalism between state and federal
courts, focusing on state constitutional decisions that expand notions
of individual rights and equal protection beyond those that prevail in
the federal courts.200 Professor Seth Davis offers an expansive reading
of the Thirteenth Amendment as a demosprudential pathway for a
movement toward collective self-determination in Black American
communities.201
Although several scholars locate demosprudence within
scholarship on popular constitutionalism and constitutional culture,202
demosprudence need not be centrally concerned with the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, there are many ways
that judges, at multiple levels, can support and enhance the democratic
capacity of the public. Judges might engage in demosprudence simply
by acknowledging the world as it is in a way that members of the public
can see and understand,203 such as by engaging in pathetic, emotion197. See Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial, supra note 194, at 2058, 2078 (describing a
demosprudential dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor in the policing case Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056 (2016)); see also Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 667, 698–702 (2015) (describing judicial absolutist rhetoric, which is often found in
dissenting opinions, as sometimes emanating from efforts to engage in demosprudence).
198. Brian Ray, Demosprudence in Comparative Perspective, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 111, 144–45
(2011).
199. Id.
200. See generally Justin R. Long, Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty Years
of Sheff v. O’Neill, 42 CONN. L. REV. 585 (2009).
201. Seth Davis, The Thirteenth Amendment and Self-Determination, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 88, 89 (2019).
202. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1728, 1752 n.116 (2017).
203. See Robert Post, Marshall as a Judge, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (2019) (describing
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s judicial philosophy as one that “appeal[ed] to the basic democratic
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resonant argumentation and not merely logical argumentation in
writings.204 Judges who write opinions can give voice to the context of
the poverty-related cases before them.
For judges who do not write opinions—as is the case in many state
civil and criminal courts—demosprudence could mean interrogating
relevant topics in court so that information appears in trial transcripts.
Demosprudence could also mean using the judicial rulemaking process
to establish principles and ethical standards that aim to reduce
systematic socioeconomic bias. Judges can interpret legal doctrine and
apply normal rules of court while simultaneously acknowledging that
the deeper solutions to the marginalization and criminalization of the
poor are not likely to be found only in courts. Judges who manage
courtrooms and dockets can do so in ways that educate themselves and
their staff about the context of poor people’s lives, so they are more
conscientious about the stakes and limitations of their decision-making
processes. Judges who set rules for the courts can start from the
vantage point of poor people’s day-to-day lives, rather than a topdown, status-quo-oriented lens for rules development. What these
notions have in common is a view that judges can ethically act to
promote participatory public dialogue even if current legal doctrine or
process do not permit direct intervention.205
B. Paths toward a Demosprudence of Poverty
1. Judges as Authors. It is well understood that judicial opinions
and orders fulfill purposes other than applying preexisting rules to
specific sets of facts to notify litigants of the outcomes of their cases.206
Some of those broader purposes can include acknowledging the harms
at the root of the dispute, educating the public about various harms,

structure of American government”); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
558 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (scolding the majority for “clos[ing] its eyes to . . . constitutional
history and social reality”).
204. See generally Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 1389 (2013) [hereinafter Greene, Pathetic Argument].
205. See, e.g., Charles C. Bridge, Comment, The Bostic Question, 126 YALE L.J. 894, 904
(2017).
206. See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, Meehan Rasch & Matthew P. Bartlett, Opinion Writing
and Opinion Readers, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2009) (identifying “primary consumers”
and “secondary markets” for opinions, and placing all interested parties other than the trial court,
the litigants, and the appellate courts in the less important secondary category); Robert A. Leflar,
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 813–14 (1961).
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recognizing the human interests at the root of the case,207 and engaging
discursively with contemporary social movements. Written orders and
opinions give judges space to engage in both logos and pathos in
multiple ways, including by recounting important contextual
information from the record.208 Reason-giving—the sine qua non of
opinion writing—is also a democracy-enhancing form of jurisprudence
that judges can engage in that empowers the public to pursue
substantive justice.209
Because judges serve as the official voice of the courts, judges are
uniquely well positioned to undertake analyses that deeply engage with
the historical and social context of substantive law, procedural issues,
and the litigants themselves. While doctrine constrains judicial orders,
it need not always constrain judicial language. For instance, judges can

207. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 23, 24, 27 (1996) (arguing that judges should use “a language that is expressive of the kind
of imagination that’s capable of perceiving the individual humanity of the people involved and
their circumstances” and that “both empathetic identification accompanied with a kind of critical
external assessment are crucial” to judging).
208. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 73–85 (2006); Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law,
2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 133, 134–36; Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 164–66 (2012); Keith J. Bybee, Paying
Attention to What Judges Say: New Directions in the Study of Judicial Decision Making, 8 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 69, 73–75 (2012); Arie Freiberg, Affective Versus Effective Justice:
Instrumentalism and Emotionalism in Criminal Justice, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 265, 267–68
(2001); Greene, Pathetic Argument, supra note 204, at 1393–97; Lynne N. Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575–77 (1987); Susanne Karstedt, Emotions and Criminal
Justice, 6 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 299, 300–02 (2002); Rebecca K. Lee, Judging Judges:
Empathy as the Litmus Test for Impartiality, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 201–03 (2013); Terry A.
Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1265 (2012); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional
Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney,
Emotional Regulation]; Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Judicial Authority and Emotion
Work, 11 JUD. REV. 329, 345–47 (2013); Sharyn Roach Anleu, David Rottman & Kathy Mack,
The Emotional Dimension of Judging: Issues, Evidence, and Insights, 52 CT. REV. 60, 61–63
(2016); Jennifer A. Scarduzio, Maintaining Order Through Deviance? The Emotional Deviance,
Power, and Professional Work of Municipal Court Judges, 25 MGMT. COMM. Q. 283, 305–07
(2011); Mark Spottswood, Emotional Fact-Finding, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 41, 46–57 (2014).
209. See Cravens, supra note 189, at 36–40. Critics of reason-giving as a solution might claim
that stated legal reasons are not the true determinants of judges’ decisions, and instead the
demographic characteristics of judges, including their ideology or political party, are more
important to understanding the decisions they render. This is the classic debate between formalist
and realist visions of judging. This critique oversimplifies motivational processes in judicial
decision-making. Law sets forth a dialogical terrain that interacts with, though certainly does not
fully overcome, demographic factors. See Bybee, supra note 208, at 80; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 43 (2007).
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use dicta demosprudentially.210 Judges can also recount facts and
context in the record in sufficient detail to recognize and reveal the
scope of injustice associated with poverty criminalization.211 They can
make linguistic choices that shed light not just on due process and
blamelessness among some of the criminalized poor, but also on the
structural dynamics of poverty criminalization that function
independently from process and blameworthiness. Judges can, subtly
or directly, convey disdain or even horror at the injustices of poverty
criminalization. In doing so, they can perhaps help weaken the legal
estrangement that flows in part from poverty criminalization.
Judge Lee Rosenthal’s opinion and order at the preliminary
injunction stage of ODonnell is representative of a judicially
demosprudential approach to opinion writing in both its strategy of
reason-giving and its rhetorical style. While Judge Rosenthal carefully
limited her legal analysis to the procedural aspects of the case, she also
richly contextualized her analysis. The opinion and order takes stock
of the historical development of bail at the federal and state levels.212 It
describes various efforts to reform bail, including contemporary
successes of bail reform throughout the nation.213 Drawing from
evidence in the record, Judge Rosenthal sheds light on the arbitrariness
of the pretrial detention processes from the defendants’ point of view,
expressing, for example, concern about the confusing questions during
pretrial assessments.214 The opinion carefully and laboriously describes
the full pretrial process for defendants. When the opinion describes
probable cause hearings, it emphasizes the bureaucratic and
programmatic qualities of the process.215 It points out that up to forty210. See Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161, 166–68 (2011)
(describing a range of different types of dicta with different justifications, including influence
upon the future development of the law).
211. The point that the facts that judges bring into opinions must be in the record is key. In
many ways, a proposal for demosprudence is a proposal that also runs toward advocates.
Demosprudential advocacy must include, among other requirements, a strategy of building out
rich records and setting forth arguments in the papers that position the judge to engage in
demosprudential opinion writing. Judicial opinion writing is actually a collaborative process
between judges, clerks, and advocates. Therefore, advocates representing the poor can enhance
a demosprudence of poverty by developing a rich record for judges to draw upon in their opinion
writing. See Peter Friedman, What Is a Judicial Author?, 62 MERCER L. REV. 519, 521–35 (2011).
212. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1073–78 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
213. Id. at 1070–84.
214. Id. at 1090–91.
215. Id. at 1092–1101; see also KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 71, at 60–98 (describing
intensive managerial processes in New York misdemeanor courts that do not fall into an
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five arrestees might be heard for only one or two minutes total during
the same probable cause hearing.216 She also points out that arrestees
must “stand[] on a marked square in the center of the room and face[]
a screen showing the Hearing Officer and Assistant District
Attorney.”217 This additional detail is demosprudentially salient
because it emphasizes the heightened dehumanization in the
misdemeanor pretrial process: arrestees interact with a human
adjudicator and the government official who is prosecuting them, but
only through a screen. Meanwhile, the arrestee is made to stand on an
“X” before a live audience, demonstrating the embodied
characteristics of display and degradation that can come along with
status as a criminal defendant. Because the hearing officer and
prosecutor are not present in the room, they do not have the type of
proximity to the proceeding that would allow them to feel the weight
of this humiliating process.218
In United States v. Bannister,219 federal district judge Jack
Weinstein sentenced twelve impoverished Black and Latinx men to
long prison terms for conspiring to sell crack cocaine.220 Sentencing is a
challenging but routine act for a federal trial judge presiding over
criminal cases.221 Nonetheless, the opinion that emerged from this

assembly-line model, given that their goal seems to be persistent management rather than speedy
conviction).
216. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1092; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1313 1328–30 (2012).
217. Id.
218. It is worth noting here that Judge Rosenthal does not use lofty rhetoric in the opinion.
But this fact does not make the opinion any less demosprudential. Indeed, some of our most
celebrated American writings evoke passionate emotional responses because they use unadorned
language to render visible some aspect of the world that usually goes unrecognized or unanalyzed.
One thinks of Gwendolyn Brooks’ “We Real Cool,” Langston Hughes’ “Harlem,” or Mary
Oliver’s “The Summer Day”—all poems that use stark, spare language. Judges engaging in a
demosprudence of poverty through opinion writing will vary in their aesthetic choices. Perhaps
the “safest” strategy, for those concerned about being perceived as emotional or activist, is to
draw upon facts in the record to reveal substantive and structural injustice, even when—as here—
dehumanization is not a Due Process Clause violation. Perhaps this straightforward writing
strategy might be especially effective as demosprudence. See Aldisert et al., supra note 206, at 39.
219. United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
220. Id. at 623–24.
221. See U.S. v. Faison, No. GJH-19-27, slip op. at 2 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2020) (“The sentencing
of defendants in federal court is such a common occurrence that it is important to occasionally
pause and remember what is at stake. . . . [I]t is crucial that judges give careful consideration to
every minute that is added to a defendant’s sentence. Liberty is the norm; every moment of
incarceration should be justified.”).
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commonplace task provides another powerful example of a
demosprudential approach to poverty criminalization.
Judge Weinstein did what he seemed to feel was required of him
as a federal judge presiding over a criminal case: he sentenced each
man to prison, meeting the statutory minimum sentences for each.222
He raised questions about the constitutionality of mandatory
minimums but perhaps believed he could not find them
unconstitutional.223 However, before moving to the sentencing portion
of his opinion, Judge Weinstein wrote nearly fifty pages about the
complex social and legal conditions that brought these twelve
defendants before the court for sentencing. The opinion begins with a
description of concentrated poverty in pregentrification BedfordStuyvesant, Brooklyn and the physical and social characteristics of the
low-rise public-housing project where the drug ring operated—
including a photograph.224 Judge Weinstein had taken the unusual step
of visiting the neighborhood where the defendants grew up before
issuing his sentencing decision, and his brief experience there shaped
how he wrote the opinion.225
The Bannister opinion also includes a lengthy section on “History
and Sociology” that explores the structural roots of Black segregation
and unemployment in urban America; the insufficiency of federal
poverty interventions such as public housing and welfare policy; the
educational, health, familial, and other conditions that emerge from
segregation and economic dispossession in urban America; the
structural roots of crime; the conditions under which Congress adopted
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which created the crack–cocaine
sentencing disparity; the roots of mass incarceration; and more.226
Judge Weinstein also describes the “terror” residents of the housing
project felt because of the drug ring,227 and he acknowledges the
defendants’ baseline level of agency—although poverty creates

222. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
223. Id. at 670, 688.
224. Id. at 624–28.
225. Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L.
REV. 543, 552; Tom Hays, Veteran Federal Judge Visits Drug Gang’s NYC Turf, USA TODAY
(Mar. 5, 2011, 8:13 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-03-053103728283_x.htm [https://perma.cc/752R-WHRK] (explaining Judge Weinstein’s rationale for
the visit, which was that he likes to visit some places where defendants live as a “reality check” to
keep the analysis from getting too “abstract”).
226. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 630–62.
227. Id. at 623, 644.
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conditions that increase crime, individuals often have some control
over participation in criminalized behavior.228 Some of the language
Judge Weinstein uses to describe the men’s familial situations and
“[s]ocial [v]alues”229 hearkens to anachronistic “culture of poverty”
arguments.230 Yet it is nonetheless clear that Judge Weinstein is using
the opinion as an opportunity to render visible the probabilistic
pipeline between poverty and imprisonment and to affirm the basic
humanity of these convicted men.231
In the conclusion of his opinion, Judge Weinstein notes that as a
sentencing judge he is required to apply controlling law to the case,
even if he plainly sees it as unjust. He writes:
Several of the sentences in this case, imposed only because of
statutory minima, are disproportionate to the crimes committed and
the backgrounds of the defendants. Their excess causes particular
concern when applied to youthful defendants. That concern is
multiplied by the imposition of these sentences upon young
defendants subject to abuse, poverty, drug and alcohol addiction,
unemployment, illiteracy, and learning disability, largely attributable
to their backgrounds.232

Judicial recognition of these structural conditions in a criminal
case—despite the judge’s inability to resolve them with the tools
directly before the court—is a type of demosprudential analysis.233
Although the ODonnell and Bannister opinions take radically different
approaches, both are emblematic of a style of judging that remains
solidly within the bounds of the judge’s role and competence while also
enhancing the judiciary’s democratic potential.

228. Id. at 669.
229. Id. at 641–42.
230. For a distillation of the debate over “culture of poverty” arguments in sociology and
social policy since the 1960s, see WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING
BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY 95–111 (2009).
231. For example, Judge Weinstein notes that the defendants had mothers, friends, romantic
partners, and other loved ones present in the courtroom. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
232. Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
233. As evidence of Bannister’s demosprudential potential, one of this Article’s authors (Bell)
learned of the Bannister case from a man who was currently incarcerated during a teaching
experience in prison. The man, who was himself from a high-poverty neighborhood similar to
pregentrification Bed-Stuy, applauded Judge Weinstein’s rich sociological analysis. The opinion’s
description of interlocking social and legal conditions rang true to him, while most opinions he
was reading in the prison’s library seemed to ignore the context of the cases they analyzed.
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2. Judges as Managers. At both the federal and state levels, judges
spend considerable amounts of time managing cases and dockets, with
deep involvement in motions practice and the discovery process.234 In
part because of growing concerns about the legitimacy of the courts,
judges and judicial reformers have been advocating for state trial
judges to be even more involved and proactive in case management.235
While this Article does not attempt to identify the full range of
possibilities for judicial case management, we identify two primary
ways that case management can serve demosprudential functions that
can reduce systemic and substantive bias against the poor.
The first example is “active judging” in the state civil trial courts.236
A growing number of state trial judges are assisting unrepresented
individuals by ensuring that their claims are made in ways—and with
the level of detail—that a court can hear.237 Under an active-judging
framework, judges do not merely sit as passive, seemingly disinterested
arbiters when poor, unrepresented litigants stand before them. Instead,
they actively intervene to ensure that the legal claims of poor litigants
find expression in their courtrooms.238 This approach is especially
useful in a legal environment where so many people are unrepresented:
most active judging takes place in the state civil courts—so-called
234. See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark,
Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 253, 262 (describing this change in the
state courts); Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J.
669, 674–84 (2010) (describing a thirty-year rise of trial judge case management in the federal
courts); James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 17–19 (1997) (explaining
that the rise of active judicial case management in the federal courts is largely attributable to the
1990 Civil Justice Reform Act, which required each federal district to develop a civil casemanagement plan); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
L.J. 27, 29 (2003).
235. See, e.g., Jennifer D. Bailey, Why Don’t Judges Case Manage?, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1071,
1071 (2019).
236. Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647,
667–72 (2017); Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at
a Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1059–60 (2017). Some
advocates for active judging juxtapose it with civil Gideon, arguing that active judging is
preferable to advocating for a right to counsel in civil cases. Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil
Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2010); Benjamin H. Barton
& Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 967, 985 (2012). We do not view active judging as trading off against civil Gideon; we
argue instead that active judging is one of many tools that judges might use to meet their ethical
obligations. An analysis of the value of active judging is not relevant to whether there should be
a right to counsel in civil courts.
237. Carpenter et al., supra note 234, at 253, 262.
238. See Carpenter, supra note 236, at 667–72.
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“poor people’s courts”—that handle matters in family law, housing,
small claims, consumer issues, and so forth, and thus “perform the
function of ceremonial degradation in the civil system.”239 Recent
scholarship has called for the expansion of the active-judging model,
including spreading the practice of diversionary “problem-solving”
drug courts in state criminal courts to state civil courts.240 The problemsolving model relies upon judges to set benchmarks for arrestees and
then monitor them.241 Although diversionary-problem-solving courts
in the criminal system have faced growing criticism from reformers for
increasing managerial surveillance and reducing procedural
protections for vulnerable people,242 the same concerns might not arise
in the civil context.243
Some critics see active judging as a step away from the neutral or
passive position that a judge is meant to occupy.244 However,
supporters of active judging seem to have won the debate, for the most
part. For instance, Comment 4 to the 2007 revisions to the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct clarifies that “[i]t is not a violation of this Rule for
a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants
the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”245 Some analysts
and supporters of active judging claim that it is a way of meeting judges’
ethical commitment to “true neutrality,” which in the pro se context

239. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts,
22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 499–503 (2015). While many poverty law scholars focus
only on these functions within civil courts, it would be reasonable to also classify state criminal
courts as poor people’s courts given the substantive and structural relationship between poverty
and criminal punishment. See supra Part I; see also Bell, Hidden Laws, supra note 161, at 8–15.
While more affluent people also have some legal problems that are heard in these courts, they
can usually avoid, for example, appearing in family court.
240. Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579,
1581 (2018).
241. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 423
(2009); see also Richard C. Boldt, A Circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts, in PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 13, 13–28 (Paul Higgins &
Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009); Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, NeoRehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most
Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2071 (2002).
242. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1657–73 (2012).
243. Steinberg, supra note 240, at 1624–31.
244. See, e.g., Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need To Curb Extreme
Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1564–69
(2005).
245. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).



2020]

   

  

TOWARD A DEMOSPRUDENCE OF POVERTY





1519

“often requires a form of engagement that may seem inconsistent with
traditional expectations for the appearance of neutrality.”246
One unfortunate aspect of the scholarly and policy literature on
active judging, however, is that it is not well defined, nor is it specific
about the details of the practice.247 Some active-judging practices are
squarely focused on procedural fixes, such as relaxing procedural
requirements for pro se litigants or carefully explaining court processes
in ways that laypeople will more readily understand.248 However, other
active-judging methods—chiefly, judicial questioning that seeks to add
more information to the record, enshrined in the trial transcript—hold
more promise for addressing substantive poverty punishment and
systemic bias. By building out the record, the judge can elicit contextual
information about poverty that might be useful in rendering a
demosprudential opinion.
The second mode of judicial case management that we see as
potentially democracy-enhancing is for judges to seek proximity and
real-world experience within communities in their jurisdictions where
the correlation between poverty and punishment is highest. It might
not always be appropriate for judges to visit the community where
defendants or poor litigants in their court come from during a major
case, but judges, and their clerks, can nonetheless proactively
familiarize themselves with impoverished communities in their
jurisdiction when they are not in the midst of a major case that affects
that neighborhood. Judges could ask their clerks and staff to spend a
designated amount of time engaged in community-oriented work in
low-income neighborhoods as part of their job duties. They could also
use demonstrated familiarity with issues affecting poor litigants and
poor defendants as hiring criteria. This set of demosprudential court
management options is less discussed in the literature than active

246. Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and
Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions,
Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 426 (2004). Zorza
disaggregates judicial neutrality from judicial passivity, claiming that “there are two dimensions
on these issues (neutral or non-neutral and engaged or passive) rather than one (passive or nonneutral), and therefore four possible judicial behavior choices rather than two.” Id. at 429. This is
a different framework from that of Professor Justin Hansford, who has argued for “cause
judging,” which unlike judicial activism, embraces the rule of clear law but rejects the idea of pure
judicial neutrality. Justin Hansford, Cause Judging, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 16 (2014).
247. Jason Parkin, Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1146 (2019).
248. Carpenter, supra note 236, at 667–72; Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1987, 2049 (1999).
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judging in civil courts, but it is potentially even more transformative, as
it aims to present decision-makers with a more visceral, tangible
experience of many of the dynamics discussed in Part I.
3. Judges as Rulemakers. Judges also make rules for how courts
will operate and how judges will behave. Much of the scholarship on
judicial rulemaking has focused on procedural rulemaking in the
federal courts, especially those processes that created the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.249 However, state court rulemaking may have
greater capacity to influence the cases and systems in which poverty
penalization is most obvious.250 In many states, state court judges—
especially the chief judge of the states’ courts of last resort—have a
central role in the court rulemaking process.251 We suggest that state
courts adopt rules that facilitate demosprudential judging with respect
to poverty.
For example, a rulemaking that better defined what it means for
an indigent defendant or litigant to have the ability to pay would have
a substantial demosprudential impact. As described in Part I, abilityto-pay hearings have been one of the chief measures of success within
the movement against LFOs. Yet, what it means for an indigent litigant
or defendant to be “able” to pay is poorly defined. Some states have
adopted statutes that specify the aspects of a defendant’s background
that are relevant to the ability-to-pay determination, such as their

249. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections
on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597 (2010) (describing the evolution of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the author’s role in shaping them); Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom
About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447 (2013) (proposing changes to the
rulemaking process for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Carrie Leonetti, Watching the Hen
House: Judicial Rulemaking and Judicial Review, 91 NEB. L. REV. 72 (2012) (discussing the
making of federal courts’ local rules and general orders); Jordan M. Singer, The Federal Courts’
Rulemaking Buffer, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2239 (2019) (emphasizing the importance of
procedural rulemaking by federal courts); see also Mila Sohoni, The Power To Privilege, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 546–48 (2015) (noting the virtues of the federal judicial rulemaking process).
250. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1868–76 (2001) (describing key differences between state
courts and federal courts, including the greater degree to which state courts have judicial authority
over court administration, that might justify distinctive state court rulemaking processes).
251. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1303, 1384 n. 241 (2018). State constitutions often set out this process. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art.
VI, §§ 149–150; ARK. CONST. amend. 80, §§ 2–3. Emblematic exceptions include California, which
since statehood has had a principle of legislative control over court rulemaking rooted in the Field
Code, and New York, which also adheres to legislative primacy in court rulemaking because of
the Field Code. Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary
Judgment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 455, 464–66 (1997).
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assets and public benefits.252 Courts are also supposed to consider the
defendant’s expenses.253 Yet, in general, there has been little guidance
offered to judges from on high about how to make an ability-to-pay
determination.254
If judges create and revise rules from the perspective of how
people actually live, they might develop different rules that would
make the courts more procedurally and substantively accessible for
poor litigants. How are judges supposed to know how any specific
litigant lives, and how well their individual life situations map onto the
structural conditions of poverty? Some analysts have argued that
privately developed technological assessment tools can help judges
truly assess a litigant’s ability to pay.255 These tools are ostensibly easy
for litigants to access and better promote the accurate assessment of
the amount a poor litigant is able to pay than the current scattered
group of regimes.256 However, evidence of more accurate outcomes to
date is still limited, and it is not yet clear what the unintended
consequences of this tool might be.257 Ultimately, the measure of this
tool’s success should not primarily be whether it was easy for indigent
litigants to use, but rather whether it produces the best substantive,
contextually rich information about a litigant’s ability to pay.
Among other factors, ability-to-pay hearings should consider the
potential hardship to families in their assessments of affordability.
Even if an indigent defendant can scrape together enough money to
cover a fee, that does not necessarily mean it is reasonably
“affordable.” Recognizing that poor defendants must often pool
familial resources in order to pay court fines, and taking note of the
well-known racial disparities in criminal punishment, one
commentator has argued that ability-to-pay hearings merely facilitate

252. See Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-To-Pay Determinations Are
Inadequate To Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
175, 202 (2019) (describing, among others, Alabama, which makes litigants list the value of assets
like motor vehicles, and New Hampshire, which inquires into litigants’ public-assistance income).
253. Id.
254. Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837,
1853–54 (2015).
255. See, e.g., Meghan M. O’Neil & J.J. Prescott, Targeting Poverty in the Courts: Improving
the Measurement of Ability To Pay, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 225 (2019) (discussing the
authors’ empirical study on an online ability-to-pay assessment tool and the finding that it
improves the accuracy of the ability-to-pay determination).
256. Id. at 221–22.
257. See id. at 225 (citing the limited sample size of the empirical study into the online abilityto-pay assessment and pointing out the potential for both litigant manipulation and judicial shirking).
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a regressive tax upon poor Black families.258 Instead of borrowing
money for subsistence, indigent defendants are borrowing money to
pay for court fees—thereby reducing their ability to rely on these ties
in the future for true needs.259 The ability-to-pay analysis should take
account of the networked lives of poor people, and they should take
care not to assume that it is cost-free for the litigant to seek financial
support from friends. Courts should be aware that poverty contributes
to the fragility of poor people’s social networks because of the difficulty
of resource sharing, and they should aim to preserve those networks
for survival and social well-being, rather than paying off court debt.
Broader approaches that incorporate research-based knowledge
about the substantive conditions of poverty and the problems poor
people encounter in courts might go further toward ending poverty
criminalization than invasive and technical individualized assessment
tools. Judges can read contextual empirical works about the daily
experiences of people living in poverty as part of the rulemaking
process. Qualitative approaches can augment the quantitative
information received from technological assessment tools, allowing the
court to gain more systematic and collective knowledge about how
people in their jurisdiction navigate life and complex institutions like
courts and other bureaucracies. Judges and court staff can even follow
the example of Judge Weinstein described above by spending time in
the neighborhoods in their jurisdictions where poor litigants reside.
In individual cases, lawyers introduce information on the record.
However, judges in rulemakings do not have the benefit of reviewing a
record produced by litigants. Therefore, judges enacting rulemakings
should be more proactive in gaining relevant information about how
poor people interact with the courts and how courts can exacerbate
punitive responses to poverty. Indeed, incorporating this type of
information within court processes in ways that affect judges’ mental
frameworks about the rulemaking process can reduce the hardships
attached to highly invasive court processes in individual cases.260 Judges
should go through the steps of articulating how they think people live

258. Zhen, supra note 252, at 193, 200.
259. See Monica C. Bell, Safety, Friendship, and Dreams, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 703,
722 (2019) (discussing the burden that poverty places on friendships); Matthew Desmond,
Disposable Ties and the Urban Poor, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1295, 1318–21 (2012) (discussing how
financial stress among the urban poor can fracture support relationships).
260. See Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478, 1503–04
(2019) (describing the level of detail required on the forma pauperis forms); see also supra Part
I.A.2.b (discussing the high level of scrutiny imposed on public-benefits recipients).
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in the world as they design court rules, rather than relying upon
assumptions about poor people’s ways of life, especially given judges’
generally elite backgrounds.261 A demosprudential perspective on
poverty, then, might also reveal the value of class–origin diversification
of the bench. Judges who have personally experienced poverty and
marginality might be best suited to see the concerns of litigants in their
courtrooms, to educate other judges about their blind spots on
substantive aspects of poverty criminalization during training and
deliberation, and in so doing to promote collective judicial impartiality.262
Judicial rulemaking and commentary can also acknowledge
judges’ obligation to root out bias in the courts, including systemic
socioeconomic bias. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
directs judges to avoid various forms of bias, including socioeconomicstatus bias, in the administration of their duties.263 Yet, as described in
Part I, judges preside over cases within larger systems that are deeply
biased in ways that judges can easily detect. There is some debate about
what judges may ethically do to respond to this bias without crossing
over into partiality. Yet, as the scholarship on active judging suggests,
to call current judicial practices “unbiased” or “neutral” is to ignore
reality in a way that itself raises ethical questions.264 Engaging in
searching inquiries that expand the contextual record to better
recognize how substantive and structural conditions of poverty operate

261. See Neitz, supra note 191, at 140 (noting how wealthy judges may make decisions
disadvantageous to poor litigants without meaning to, simply because they cannot understand
poor litigants’ circumstances); Lisa R. Pruitt, Who’s Afraid of White Class Migrants? On Denial,
Discrediting, and Disdain (and Toward a Richer Conception of Diversity), 31 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 196, 252 n.194 (2015) (discussing how judges across the country are disproportionately upper class).
262. See Carlton W. Reeves, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Prepared Remarks: Defending the Judiciary: A Call for Justice, Truth, and Diversity on the
Bench, at 12 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/4-11-19-judge-reevesspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/43FL-E8P8] (“Filled only with the experiences of prosecutors and
state court judges, of Big Law partners and corporate counsel, of a single religion or sexual
orientation, our courts will fail to find the many truths justice must see. We need a judiciary as
diverse as our country – as diverse as ‘We the People.’”); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial
Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
405, 411 (2000) (arguing that diversity on the bench leads to impartiality); Maya Sen, Diversity,
Qualifications, and Ideology: How Female and Minority Judges Have Changed, or Not Changed,
over Time, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 367, 370 (describing the ideological gap between female and
minority judges and their white male counterparts).
263. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
264. See Zorza, supra note 246, at 428 (discussing how a judge who appears neutral by acting
passively can actually enable nonneutral outcomes given extrinsic forces pushing against
neutrality).
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in a case is not to be biased; in fact, it may increase the aggregate
neutrality of the system.
III. TWO POTENTIAL CRITIQUES OF A JUDICIAL DEMOSPRUDENCE
OF POVERTY
Despite the promise of judicial demosprudence, there are several
possible criticisms of this approach. This Part briefly identifies and
responds to two such critiques.
A. Opinion Writing
One critique of the approaches outlined above might be that one
of the central demosprudential techniques, writing opinions, is not
available to many judges—especially those who most consistently
confront substantive and structural aspects of poverty criminalization
in their courtrooms. Opinion writing is a routine activity for some
judges, but it is an infrequent practice among others. Through the
multiple steps in litigation, judges usually issue orders without a
detailed explanation of their reasoning.265 Even in the final disposition
of the case, judges consider the relative impact of a potential opinion
on other parties not before the court, and may issue something less
than a signed, published opinion.266 Also, few cases are decided through
formal adjudication. In the criminal system, a massive number of cases
are resolved through plea agreements—so many that the criminal
justice system might reasonably be labeled “a system of pleas.”267 In
the rare circumstance that a state court fully adjudicates a criminal
case, there is considerable state-level heterogeneity in whether a jury
of the defendant’s peers or the judge will ultimately decide the case.268

265. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 (2007) (finding that written reason-giving is
scarce in the federal trial courts).
266. See Aldisert et al., supra note 206, at 11 (stating that the majority of U.S. Courts of
Appeals opinions are nonprecedential memorandum opinions designed for the parties only); Bert
I. Huang & Tejas N. Narechania, Judicial Priorities, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1719, 1731–32 (2015)
(describing the use of the summary order in Illinois appellate courts as well as the limit imposed
on the number of precedential opinions allowed to be issued); see also Ira P. Robbins, Hiding
Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV.
1197, 1197 (2012) (arguing that courts overuse per curiam opinions and proposing their
curtailment for purposes of transparency and judicial accountability).
267. Crespo, supra note 251, at 1388.
268. T. Ward Frampton, Comment, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury
Trial Rates Vary by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 192 (2012).



2020]

   

  

TOWARD A DEMOSPRUDENCE OF POVERTY





1525

In civil courts, most cases are decided through settlement processes.269
Even when a judge resolves a case through a bench trial, the length of
state trial dockets can weigh against writing a detailed opinion in cases
where it might otherwise be valuable. All of these characteristics of
adjudication mean that this particular demosprudential tool is not truly
available across all judges, in all courts.
There are, indeed, significant limits to a model of demosprudence
that relies primarily on judicial opinions. It is for this reason that the
approach advocated in this Article expands the notion of
demosprudence beyond its usual parameters, reaching into the other
types of daily work judges do. Most previous work that discusses
judicial demosprudence has focused on constitutional rights,
international law, federalism, and other topics that may be more likely
to result in judicial opinions and to be litigated in federal courts.270 As
described in Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3, thinking about demosprudence
from a poverty lens demands attention to other tools, especially tools
that might be more available to judges who confront poverty in “poor
people’s courts” and misdemeanor courts.271 One contribution of this
Article is to bring to light the democratic possibilities within aspects of
judging that tend to receive less attention than opinion writing in legal
scholarship, such as court management and rulemaking.
B. The Roles of Judges
Some would reject the idea that judges should take
demosprudential approaches to their work. Critics might argue that
judging is an act of detachment and formal independence from the
concerns of regular people—a job that should rigorously avoid
normative visions of justice that do not emanate directly from current
law or doctrine.272 Professor Terry Maroney has helpfully referred to
269. See Jeffrey A. Parness, American General Jurisdiction Trial Courts: New Visions, New
Guidelines, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 189, 189 (2006) (noting the changing role of trial court judges,
from running trials in court to overseeing settlements outside of court); see also Owen M. Fiss,
Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (analogizing the then-growing
phenomenon of civil settlement to plea bargaining and arguing that both are troublesome because
of potential coerciveness, their lack of appealability, their decentering of judicial authority, and
their prioritization of docket trimming over justice); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 999 (2000) (critiquing a
similar phenomenon in the federal courts).
270. See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
271. See text accompanying note 245 supra.
272. See Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Status, and
Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1996)



1526

   

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

  





[Vol. 69:1473

this idea as “the cultural script of judicial dispassion”: a deep-rooted
and resilient Western notion that judging, properly done, is as insulated
from human life and emotion as possible.273
This vision of judging, however, is at best quixotic. It relies upon
assumptions about judging that ignore the ineluctable interplay
between law, legal interpretation, and cultural change.274 It also fails to
represent the actual daily labor of judging, especially in the trial courts
where poverty criminalization is most consistent and apparent. It omits
the mundane difficulty of judging. It overlooks the emotional labor
associated with issuing binding decisions on important matters
affecting real people.275 Only in the rarest of circumstances is judging a
purely theoretical exercise—and, arguably, judging should never be
thought of as detached from human wisdom or experience.276 Judge
Denny Chin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit argues
that, although empathy “should play no role in a judge’s determination
of what the law is,” empathy and even emotion are nonetheless
“essential . . . in the real-world, day-to-day administration of justice.”277
(discussing the view that judicial decision-making should be an objective process). Justice William
Brennan famously rejected this conception of judging, arguing in contrast that emotional
sensitivity, passion, and empathy were indispensable to judging even at the appellate level. See
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 3 (1988).
273. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 629, 631, 634 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Persistent Cultural Script].
274. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 16, at 60 (describing how
changes in constitutional understanding stem from the interactions between citizens and the
judiciary); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (same).
275. See Maroney, Persistent Cultural Script, supra note 273, at 643 (discussing judges’ regular
engagement with emotion); Judith Resnik, Feminism and the Language of Judging, 22 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 31, 36–37 (1990) [hereinafter Resnik, Feminism] (describing a feminist analysis of judging that
recognizes that “judges are socially and culturally imbedded (and should be),” analyzes “judging
as a painful and difficult activity,” and acknowledges that “[c]ompassion is constantly an activity
that judges and juries engage in, often without a vocabulary to describe and discuss it”).
276. See Resnik, Feminism, supra note 275, at 35–36 (noting the interconnectedness of
judges); Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges
Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 911 (2015) (“Troubling or not,
judges’ emotional reactions are inevitable. Judges are not computers. By design, the justice system
is a human process . . . .”).
277. Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1563–64 (2012).
To be sure, emotion should not run unchecked and unregulated through the judicial system, not
least because judicial emotion could increase bias, not reduce it. See Laurie L. Levenson, Judicial
Ethics: Lessons from the Chicago Eight Trial, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 879, 902 (2019) (emphasizing
the danger of uncontrolled judicial anger); Maroney, Emotional Regulation, supra note 208, at
1501–04 (discussing the need to regulate emotion based on the environment); cf. GONZALEZ VAN
CLEVE, supra note 186, at 15–49 (describing implicit and explicit judicial bias in criminal courts in
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Recognition of the human condition, including by acknowledging
evidence of the multifaceted relationship between poverty and legal
marginalization, is not only permissible but also necessary to good
judging—assuming that democracy enhancement and truth telling are
goals of the judicial process.278
Critically,
judges
cannot,
working
alone,
produce
demosprudential results or solve the problem of poverty
criminalization. Scholarship on demosprudence often examines other
parts of the ecosystem of lawmaking and democracy building.279 More
importantly, the theory of change that undergirds our argument is not
judge-centric or focused solely upon top-down decisions by elites. It is
too naïve, however, to say only that movements should organize and
political branches should act; scholars must also examine, deconstruct,
and redirect the role of judges and other legal elites in the current
poverty criminalization ecosystem.
CONCLUSION: FROM COURTS TO MOVEMENTS
Although this proposal focuses on judges, the deeper change
needed to eradicate the criminalization of poverty does not begin or
end with judges. Demosprudence employs a different theory of change

Cook County, Illinois); Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think About Racial
Disparities: Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332,
353 (2016) (describing judges’ bias-mitigating strategies). Indeed, given most judges’ elite
backgrounds, some have hypothesized—though at this point with scant empirical support—that
they are more likely to sympathize with well-off litigants than poor ones. See, e.g., Orley
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence
of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 275–81 (1995) (describing an
empirical analysis about how judges’ own characteristics affect outcomes in civil rights cases); see
also Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1463–65 (1998) (finding
that attending an elite law school correlates with practical reasoning for judges). But see Tracey
E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 27–28 (2001) (discussing how judges who went to
elite law schools are more likely to sympathize with a disadvantaged party). A challenge for this
empirical research is that a blunt variable might not easily capture the aspects of an elite
background that would be most relevant to judicial decision-making. Also, because judging is an
elite position within the elite legal profession, perhaps the relevant question is not whether judges
with the most elite backgrounds judge differently from those with somewhat less elite
backgrounds; instead, it is whether a less socioeconomically hierarchical judiciary would, in the
aggregate, produce a legal decision-making apparatus that is less likely to penalize poverty.
Measures should, at the least, focus on the collective characteristics of judicial systems, not the
individual characteristics of particular judges.
278. See Greene, Pathetic Argument, supra note 204, at 1452–56 (describing pathetic argument
as democratic).
279. See supra note 194 (discussing the scholarship on demosprudence by nonjudicial actors).
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than traditional jurisprudence does: it recognizes that although legal
elites like judges can and should promote democracy and social
engagement, legal elites cannot be at the center of these movements. It
does not repudiate rights claims but instead sees rights and courts as
flawed and incomplete aspects of legal architecture that would
nevertheless be unwise to ignore in practical movements for power
redistribution and justice.280
Judges are one class among many institutional actors that operate
together to produce the system. As Professor Robert Cover described,
“[w]hen [judges] oppose the violence and coercion of the other organs
of the state, judges begin to look more like the other jurisgenerative
communities of the world.”281 A judge working in service of justice
today is, by necessity, conversant with the burgeoning social movement
against poverty criminalization. An iterative relationship between
judges and social movements is a precondition of a demosprudential
perspective. The judicial demosprudence we describe here offers
practical ways that judges can intervene in legal violence against the
poor,282 and in so doing, better meet their ethical obligations as judges.
More broadly, a judicial demosprudence of poverty protects the
fundamental interests of equal and equitable justice under law.

280. Compare Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
405, 445–47 (2018) (discussing how social movements are necessary to expand the concept of
rights), and Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1370–71 (1984) (arguing
that rights themselves are not important but the politically effective action that preceded them
is), with Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410 (1987) (arguing that the rhetoric of rights is important in
itself), and Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, Note, Beyond the Critique of Rights: The Puerto Rico Legal
Project and Civil Rights Litigation in America’s Colony, 128 YALE L.J. 792, 839–42 (2019)
(discussing the use of rights to protect social movements in Puerto Rico).
281. Cover, supra note 192, at 57–58.
282. See Cecilia Menjívar & Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives
of Central American Immigrants, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1380, 1387 (2012) (“Legal violence . . . is
embedded in the body of law that, while it purports to have the positive objective of protecting
rights or controlling behavior for the general good, simultaneously gives rise to practices that
harm a particular social group.”).

